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Abstract
The relationship between legal forms of firm organization and economic develop-
ment remains poorly understood. Recent research disputes the view that the joint-stock
corporation played a crucial role in historical economic development, but retains the
view that the costless firm dissolution implicit in non-corporate forms is detrimental
to investment. We demonstrate the benefits of costless dissolution in an environment
where potential business partners are not fully-informed. Using a multi-armed bandit
model, we show that an experimentation mechanism creates a spike in dissolution rates
early in firms’ lives, as less productive matches break down and agents look for better
matches. We test the model’s predictions using a novel firm-level dataset compris-
ing more than 12,000 enterprises established in Egypt between 1910 and 1949. Most
partnerships dissolved within two years; afterwards, the risk of dissolution dropped to
a lower, steady level. Corporations had much more uniform and lower attrition rates.
Companies made up of partners who had been in business before also had flatter dissolu-
tion rates, confirming the link between learning and the early break-up of partnerships.
The partnership reflected a trade-off between committing to a partner and sorting into
potentially better matches.
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What is the relationship between the legal organization of business firms and economic devel-
opment? Economic expansion requires capital accumulation and investment in productive
enterprises over long periods of time. The rules for business enterprises can affect firm
longevity and capital accumulation by shaping the incentives to create and invest in firms.
Partnerships were long the most common form of firm organization, but this form does not
exist independent of its members. Such enterprises can be dissolved at any moment if a
partner dies or withdraws. The corporation, on the other hand, exists separately from its
owners, and has locked-in capital (Blair and Stout (2005), Stout (2005)). No shareholder
can dissolve the firm by withdrawing their investment; the corporation’s existence is not
conditioned on any single shareholder’s willingness to participate.
An influential literature views the corporate form as critical in Europe’s and the United
States’ success in rapid industrialization (e.g., Chandler 1977, Cochran 1977). These works
argue that partnerships, because they are at-will, could not lock in capital and undertake
long-term investment. Recent research disputes the idea of a universally superior corporate
form, but still views costless dissolution as a disadvantage to partnership forms. (Lamoreaux
and Rosenthal 2005, Guinnane et al. 2007). We stress an advantage of costless dissolution:
it encourages experimentation that can improve enterprise quality. We formalize the prob-
lem with a theory of company formation and dissolution, then provide empirical evidence
consistent with the model’s predictions. This empirical exercise rests on a novel firm-level
database composed of some 12,000 partnerships and corporations established in Egypt be-
tween 1910 and 1949. Costless dissolution allowed entrepreneurs to experiment with several
partners until they sorted into matches with the “right” partner. Only fifty-seven percent of
Egyptian partnerships in our data lasted at least two years, compared to ninety-six percent
of corporations. For many ventures, high dissolution cost from the start would have locked
partners into unproductive ventures or deterred formation of ventures in the first place.
For other partners whose joint productivity is sufficiently high, however, the partnership’s
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ease of dissolution discourages larger investment and cooperation because agents can deviate
from investment plans, dissolve the firm, and re-match with a new partner. The corpora-
tion’s lock-in feature offers these firms a more attractive option. This paper thus provides a
new way to think about enterprise form adoption and firm longevity by taking the trade-off
between experimentation and commitment seriously.
We start with a model based on a multi-armed bandit framework. Agents match to
one another to produce some surplus in each period. Match success rate depends on the
match quality, which the partners do not observe but on which they share a common prior.
The enterprise’s observed success rate informs the partners of the actual match quality. If
partners share pessimistic posteriors, they dissolve the firm and move on to new partners.
If partners believe the match quality is sufficiently high, they remain in their current match
and provide increased investment or effort to the firm. At this point, however, the ease
of dissolution becomes a hindrance because it encourages each partner to free ride on the
other’s effort and then re-match. Thus, partnerships that survive the initial trial period will
find it profitable to “tie the knot” and incorporate in order to induce cooperation.
Empirical analysis of the Egyptian multi-owner enterprises supports the model’s predic-
tions. Because of the learning mechanism, the risk of a firm’s dissolution differed significantly
based on the underlying ownership structure. Partnerships suffered particularly high rates of
attrition within the first few years of their establishment. Conditional on surviving this pe-
riod, partnership failure rates dropped and became more uniform. As partners experimented
through successive partnerships, they were able to sort into more productive matches. The
corporations’ risk of dissolution, on the other hand, remained fairly constant throughout the
first few years of existence.
The results support the idea that dissolution reflects experimentation. Firms that contain
partners who have been in business together before do not dissolve as quickly, because they
have prior knowledge about match quality. Firms with family members also endure. A
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second and later partnership involving the same family members has no additional survival
benefit, showing that information about partners matters more than kin ties.
This paper contributes to a rich literature centered on the impact of institutions on
economic performance. This literature typically takes a macro-level approach, regressing
a country-level outcome measure such as current GDP per capita on variables intended
to measure the quality of institutions.1 While generating some empirical insights, cross-
country studies cannot effectively isolate the channels through which institutions interact
with economic agents. The micro approach taken here unpacks these correlations by focusing
on a specific legal institution—the menu of enterprise forms—to understand and document
the learning mechanism underlying firm formation and dissolution dynamics.
The evolution of legal forms of business organization, and the ease or difficulty of es-
tablishing joint-stock corporations have particular significance for business expansion and
growth. Chandler (1977) convinced many that the corporation held the key to economic de-
velopment. Indeed, the corporation confers a number of important advantages to large-scale
enterprises that require extensive investment with long maturity. Such advantages include
legal personhood, capital pooling, limited liability, entity shielding, and concentrated man-
agement (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000). Economic historians, however, have challenged
Chandler’s view by showing that partnership forms remained popular in many European
economies even when the joint-stock corporation became widely available (Guinnane et al.
2007). However, this entire debate has overlooked two points. First, Chandler’s recent critics
have also stressed that the partnerships’ low dissolution costs had detrimental implications
for enterprise growth. This work has not explored the point emphasized here, that the part-
nership offered entrepreneurs a way to experiment with potential partners at relatively low
cost. Second, nearly all of the literature on historical enterprise forms has focused on the
1A comprehensive list of papers is beyond the scope of this paper. See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005) and the references therein for an extensive review of this literature.
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experience of Western Europe and the United States. We thus build on earlier research by
offering a new theory that explains micro-level patterns in a non-European setting.2
Until Kuran’s (2011) pioneering book on institutions and economic growth in the Middle
East, debates on institutions and development has largely ignored that region. The Middle
East formed Europe’s main economic and political competitor in the early modern period,
but was surpassed by even the more peripheral European economies in the late 1800s.3 Much
like Owen’s (1991) earlier study of Russian institutions, Kuran argues that the restrictive
menu of enterprise forms in the Middle East underlies the region’s economic stagnation.
Kuran’s argument stresses the problem of untimely dissolution in partnership forms. Kuran
(2011) maintains that egalitarian and inflexible inheritance rules in Islamic law exacerbated
the problem of untimely dissolution by prescribing joint ownership of a partner’s assets for
his inheritors. Incorporation would have allowed investors to avoid disadvantages. Thus,
high barriers to incorporation effectively prevented long-term, large-scale investment.4
Kuran’s view of partnerships thus follows earlier work in stressing the costs of easy
dissolution. In that he is certainly correct. As the model below highlights, some valuable
firms cannot sustain high productivity without costly dissolution. Our empirical work also
demonstrates the fragility of the partnership in the region Kuran studies. We differ, however,
in stressing that the rapid dissolution of partnerships also offered benefits.
Finally, this paper contributes to the larger theoretical and empirical literature on part-
nerships and matches. Jovanovic (1979) and Miller (1984), for instance, use a multi-armed
bandit framework to analyze competitive labor markets.5 Our model builds on McAdams
2A nascent literature considers direct links between firms performance and enterprise forms in settings
outside of Western Europe. Gregg (2015) shows a link between enterprise forms, scale, and productivity in
Imperial Russia using a novel factory-level dataset. Nicholas (2015) demonstrates that joint-stock corpo-
rations played an important role in Japan’s business expansion by explicitly establishing a robust relation
between firm performance and enterprise forms.
3See Özmucur and Pamuk (2002) for historical wage series in Istanbul and Pamuk (2006) for GDP per
capita figures in the Middle East.
4Indeed, the literature on Islamic partnerships made use of court registers to demonstrate that Islamic
partnerships were small (made up of two or three partners on average) and did not last very long. See
Çizakça (1996), Gedikli (1998), and Kuran (2011).
5See Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) for an overview of bandit problems and their other applications in
the literature.
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(2011), who formalizes the interaction of matched partners in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
McAdams generates the same prediction of high rates of early attrition and survivorship bias.
We extend the model by introducing the option of incorporation, which we treated as an
endogenously-chosen increase in dissolution costs. Earlier empirical studies also address re-
lated questions. Topel and Ward (1992) shows a similar pattern of turnover in employment.
In his exploration of high firm dissolution rates among young enterprises in the Argentinian
and Irish newspaper industries, Levinthal (1991) argues that a sequence of initial success can
shield firms from failure later. Our findings echo these results by documenting high mortality
among young partnerships. Our results for corporations, on the other hand, imply a differ-
ent story; corporations do not exhibit the high early mortality found in partnerships.Our
evidence is more consistent with the view that organizations exhibit high rates of dissolu-
tion early on due to uncertainty regarding matches (and learning about the match quality
through initial trial rounds), rather than the protection of initial successes against future
shocks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the rich historical back-
ground of Egypt’s legal institutions during the first half of the twentieth century. Section 3
describes this paper’s large-scale data collection effort and the sources of the dataset. Section
4 develops a theory of partnerships by building on multi-armed bandit models and yields
several predictions that it later illustrates with simulations. Section 5 takes these predictions
to the data.. Section 6 summarizes the findings with concluding remarks.
2 Institutional Background
Increasing European presence in nineteenth-century Egypt led to legal disarray. A conces-
sion system gave Europeans extraterritorial rights that included the right to contract under
their own law and to litigate using their consular courts. This situation created uncertainty
about just which law would apply to contractual relations between natives and Europeans,
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or between Europeans of different nationalities.6 The Egyptian government attempted to
rectify this problem in 1875 by introducing a new court system: the Mixed Courts. The new
legal system operated independent of the executive. The Mixed Courts applied a slightly
modified form of French law, followed French legal procedure, and held jurisdiction over
all commercial and civil cases involving people of different national jurisdictions. The new
courts also had jurisdiction over Egyptians forming companies. The new courts were estab-
lished in Alexandria, Cairo, and Mansoura. Judges included both Europeans and Egyptians.
Both contemporaries and more recent observers view the Mixed Courts as impartial and in-
dependent.7 The government abolished the Mixed Courts in 1949 as part of a larger plan to
nationalize the legal system.
These reforms did not abolish legal pluralism, but they did end both consular and religious
courts’ role in commercial issues. Establishing a clear demarcation across cases and litigants
prevented opportunistic forum shopping.8 Both locals and Europeans relied on the Mixed
Courts for their commercial affairs.9 The Mixed Courts dealt with a range of commercial
issues, including company law. Any multi-owner enterprise operating primarily in Egypt
had to register with the Mixed Courts and fell under the Courts’ jurisdiction. The dataset
described below thus comes as close as possible to spanning the entire population of multi-
owner enterprises in Cairo, Alexandria, and Mansoura.
6Egypt was an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire until the Empire’s dissolution after
World War I. Artunç (2014) provides a comprehensive analysis of Ottoman legal pluralism.
7Grigsby (1896) presents a contemporary account of the Mixed and Native Courts. Herreros (1914)
describes the judicial system at the beginning of the twentieth century. See Hoyle (1991) for a more recent
description.
8Artunç (2014) shows that legal pluralism can give rise to inefficiencies if agents can unilaterally in-
voke choice of law ex post. This kind of rent-seeking creates enforcement uncertainty and reduces contract
credibility.
9This is consistent with the model of legal pluralism Artunç (2014) presents. The Mixed Courts held
high prestige, the European courts respected the Mixed Courts’ decisions, and the Native Courts closely
mimicked the Mixed Courts. Hence, the Mixed Courts enjoyed higher enforcement reliability. Wood (2011)
shows that jurisdictional conflicts arose frequently within the pluralistic system of Mixed, Native, Consular,
and religious courts until the early 1900s, stabilizing in 1912–13; see pp. 46–51. Scott (1907) describes
that since Mixed Courts held jurisdiction over any commercial case with a “mixed interest” (i.e. involving
stakeholders with different nationalities), partnerships were routinely included under their jurisdiction.
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Because the Mixed Courts applied the French commercial code, they introduced new en-
terprise forms to the Egyptian economy. Table 1 shows these forms, which included société
en nom collectif (general partnership), société en commandite simple (limited partnership),
société en commandite par actions (limited partnership with tradable shares), and société
anonyme (corporation). General partnerships had two or more general partners, all of whom
had unlimited liability. Any one of these partners could participate in company management.
Limited partnerships consisted of at least one general partner and one “special” or limited
partner. General partners had unlimited liability and control rights over assets; limited
partners were only liable up to the amount they invested and had no rights over the firm’s
management. Both general and limited partnerships could contract flexibly on cash-flow
and control rights, subject to these limitations. Limited partnerships with tradable shares
resembled limited partnerships, except that the limited partners’ capital was divided into
shares which could be traded on the stock market. Agents were free to choose any of these
forms when they wrote a partnership contract. Forming a corporation, however, required the
Egyptian government’s permission. Before the Mixed Courts’ introduction, European enter-
prise forms were only available to European subjects under consular jurisdiction. The native
population, on the other hand, had been using Islamic partnerships until the transplantation
of this French-style commercial code.
3 Data and Sources
This paper’s empirical results rely on a new, firm-level dataset based on the activities of
the Mixed Courts. The database includes the registration and sometimes dissolution of
more than 12,000 firms with 28,000 individual partners. This section describes the sources
and provides information necessary to the discussion here and in Section 5. The Appendix
provides more information on data construction.
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Starting in November 1910, Egyptian Mixed Courts started publishing a monthly peri-
odical in French, Gazette des Tribunaux mixtes d’Égypte. Another newspaper, Journal des
Tribunaux mixtes started in November 1921. This second publication terminated on March
31, 1949, which marks the end of the dataset.
The Gazette and Journal printed (among many other things) extracts of partnership
agreements, modifications to existing agreements, and dissolutions registered at the Mixed
Courts. The law required partnerships to register their contracts at the local court, and pub-
lish summaries of these contracts in the newspapers. Companies risked annulment if they
did not register partnership agreements or modifications within two weeks of registration.
We observe examples where the courts annulled partnerships retroactively for not registering
and publishing the partnership contract. The dataset thus captures the universe of multi-
owner enterprises organized under the Mixed Courts’ jurisdiction. The law mandated that
the published extracts contain the following information: company name, enterprise form,
general partners’ names, designation of partners who had authorization to manage or admin-
ister the company and sign for the firm, capital provided by shares or by limited partners,
and the firm’s start and termination date, if any. Corporations published their entire articles
of association.10
Our empirical tests require both the firm’s formation date and dissolution date. Firm
histories can be censored on both sides. Businesses established before October 1, 1910 might
be dissolved during our period of analysis; we do not know their formation date. Some
firms established in this period dissolved after March 31, 1949. For consistency, we focus on
enterprises that were established between these two dates. We then match dissolution acts
to initial partnership agreements and censor each surviving company at the end of March
1949.
De-registration information is not as complete as other parts of the database. By law,
parties had to announce their firm’s dissolution. The law did not, however, specify how
10See articles 54–58 of the Mixed Courts’ commercial code, Egypt (1907) pp. 156–7.
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this rule was enforced. We can impute missing dissolution dates in two ways. Many firms
stated a fixed duration in their articles of association. Many probably did not de-register
when they reached that date; if we were willing to assume that all firms operated until
the end of their original contracted period, we could assume a dissolution date from the
contract terms. We prefer instead to rely on information about operating firms taken from
the Egyptian Directory, which was published annually from 1907 well into the 1950s. These
volumes provide a comprehensive list of all commercial enterprises operating in various cities
in Egypt. By cross-checking every enterprise without a dissolution date against firms listed
in the directories, we determined the last year a firm appeared to be in operation. We
assume that if a firm appeared in the directory in 1930 but not in 1931, for example, it
wound-up operations in 1930. We assume that companies that had no de-registration dates
but appeared in all directories up to and including the 1950 directory survived.
The database also contains individual-level information about firm owners: general part-
ners in partnerships and founding subscribers in corporations. We use owners’ names to
code ethno-religious identifiers for each individual (e.g. Muslim, Jewish, Greek). We also
matched partners across multiple partnerships using their names, cross-checking with the
information in the commercial directory. Using each individual’s last name, or their fathers’
names (usually specified as part of the individual’s name), we also identity family firms.
We consider an enterprise a family firm if more than four fifths of all general partners were
related in a general partnership, if more than half of shares were owned by members of
the same family in a corporation, or if the firm called itself a family company by using an
identifier such as “sons,” “brothers,” or “cousins.” This procedure produces an undercount
of family firms, because we cannot identify son-in-laws or married sisters. Few enterprises
list limited partners by name, so we also cannot identify some family connections of this
type. While most firms reported their capitalization in nominal Egyptian pounds, others
used either pounds sterling, French francs, or Ottoman pounds. We convert these values
to pounds sterling using exchange rates cited in Denzel (2010), Owen (1993), and Pamuk
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(2000). These calculations use the historic opportunity cost method to express capitalization
in real terms. Many firms did not report their capitalization in the published extracts; we
discuss this limitation in detail in Section 5 and in the Appendix.11
The dataset includes 12,365 partnerships and corporations established between 1910 and
1949. For all of these firms, information about the number and identity of general partners
is available. About fifty-four percent of the sample also reported their initial capitalization.
Some fifty percent of companies formed from 1910 onwards reported dissolution within the
period this paper examines. We know, from the directories, that nearly seventy percent
of the firms that did not de-register survived the period of observation. For the rest, a
dissolution date is imputed using the last date they appear in the commercial directory.
3.1 An Overview of Egyptian Enterprises
The newly-constructed dataset allows us to establish five new facts that motivate some
of the modeling choices in the theory and empirical sections. First, company formations
and dissolutions varied across the business cycle. Second, the partnership was by far the
most common enterprise form. Third, most companies had only two partners and small
capitalization. Fourth, contrary to the previous literature’s claims, enterprise-form and size
distributions in Egypt differed little from European patterns. Fifth, the vast majority of
partners in a given firm came from the same ethno-religious group. Ethnically heterogeneous
partnerships were rare, and family firms accounted for a substantial proportion of enterprises.
Table 2 summarizes these findings.
Figure 1 shows the evolution new multi-ownership firms and dissolutions between 1911
and 1948.12 The formation and dissolution of firms co-moves with macroeconomic condi-
11We use pounds sterling as of 2010, http://www.measuringworth.com to adjust asset size in real terms.
Historic opportunity cost is the most appropriate method for comparing firm capitalization. This method uses
the GDP deflator to compare the cost index of all output in the economy. The British historic opportunity
cost is suitable in this setting given Egypt’s close integration with the British economy and currency; see
Yousef (2002).
12We omitted firms founded in 1910 and 1949 from this graph since the dataset starts in November 1910
and ends in March 1949.
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tions. Periods of economic upturn coincided with a spike in the formation and dissolution
of new companies. Similarly, fewer firms formed or dissolved during economic downturns.
In other words, peaks in the business cycle accompanied an expansion in, which declined
during busts. In a separate paper, Artunç (2017) examines this relationship econometri-
cally and shows that firm cohorts established during recessions were different from those
established during expansions in many dimensions, including entrant rates, capitalization
and number of partners. More precisely, the elasticity of changes in entry rates with respect
to fluctuations in cotton prices was 0.30. The elasticity of capitalization with respect to
changes in cotton prices was -0.33. Cotton prices had no significant impact on aggregate
dissolution rates. Expansionary economic periods led to a contemporaneous expansion in
the entry rate, predominantly selecting on less heavily capitalized companies. Most com-
panies dissolved quickly regardless of how well the economy was doing. In this paper, we
show an important determinant of this empirical pattern: most partnerships dissolved within
two years of their formation due to experimentation and learning independent of economic
conditions. This provides a new way to think about commercial expansion and contraction
across business cycles.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of companies across enterprise forms between 1916 and
1945. Just as in Europe, most Egyptian firms organized as general or limited partnerships.13
We see little systematic evolution in the choice of enterprise form over time. Overall, 53
percent of all new firms formed as general partnerships, and 41 percent as limited partner-
ships. Not surprisingly, corporations were less common than general or limited partnerships,
reflecting the costly process of acquiring permission to incorporate from the government.
Despite the higher burden put on the organizers of corporations, that form’s prevalence in
13Guinnane et al. (2007) show that ordinary partnerships accounted for 60 percent of all new companies in
France even after the government introduced general incorporation in 1863. In Prussia (and later Germany),
partnerships accounted for more than 80 percent of new firms until 1902. See pp. 702 and 710–1.
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Egypt differed little from what we observe in Germany and France in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.14
We have two ways to measure firm size: the number of partners and the initial capital-
ization. Partner numbers and capitalization affect the firm’s chance of survival. First, any
single general partner can force dissolution in a partnership. We might expect the risk of
dissolution to increase with the number of general partners.15 Second, some partnerships
might break up early because of low capitalization. Small firms might be more vulnerable to
negative shocks than large companies. Third, on a related point, one might think that the
firm survival rates reflect the concentration of enterprise forms in specific industries.
Table 2 shows that most firms were small, with two general partners on average. However,
there were some larger firms at the upper tail. Table 3 unpacks these averages by reporting
the size distribution by different legal forms. Seventy-one percent of all general partnerships
had two general partners, most of whom had joint control and management. Thus, the modal
general partnership consisted of two agents who, as a matter of default rules, shared control
rights over the company. In comparison, most limited partnerships involved one general
partner and one limited partner.16
14See Guinnane et al. (2007) for the breakdown of new companies by enterprise form. The data contain a
few private limited liability companies (PLLCs) registered in Alexandria and Cairo. The Mixed Courts did
not recognize the PLLC as an enterprise form. The courts treated one of these PLLCs as being one of the
three enterprise forms the code recognized; see Gazette des Tribunaux mixtes d’Égypte, v. 5, pp. 145–6; v.
12 pp. 17–8. It is uncertain what kind of legal status this GmbH in the data actually enjoyed. After 1929,
more firms were registered as PLLCs, all of which were put under the jurisdiction of English law. Given
their uncertain position, we exclude PLLCs from this analysis.
15In societies such as Egypt in this period, mortality alone would dissolve many
partnerships. A rough calculation from the UN model life tables “general, male”
(http://www.un.org/esa/population/techcoop/DemMod/model_lifetabs/Model_LT_Annex3.pdf)
provides an illustrate. For a mortality level corresponding to an expectation of life at birth of 45 years, a
considerable over-estimate for this time and place, there would be a 14 percent chance of at least one of two
40 year-old males dying within five years. With three partners at that age, the probability increases to 21
percent. For 60 year-old males, the 31 percent of two-person and 43 percent of three-person partnerships
would lose at least one owner to death. These calculations treat the mortality risk of each partner as
independent.
16Although many partnerships specified the number of limited partners investing in the firm, many did
not. The law itself does not mandate the disclosure of such information. Article 56 of the commercial code
prohibits firms from reporting limited partners’ identity in the published extracts; Egypt (1907), p. 157.
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European partnerships differed little in size from their Egyptian counterparts.17 Part-
nerships organized under Islamic law also differed little in size and capitalization from what
we see here.18 Switching to European law did not alter partnership size, at least in Egypt.
The capitalization data requires caution because of possible sample selection issues, but
one can infer patterns from what is available. Table 2 shows that partnerships on average
had much smaller capitalization than did corporations. Variation in capitalization within
an enterprise form was also considerable. Figure 3 shows the capitalization distribution of
multi-owned enterprises by legal form, expressed in the natural logarithm of pounds sterling
(2010 prices). A wide range of firms, from small grocery stores to large land companies,
preferred to organize their business as partnerships. The two largest firms in the dataset
organized as a general and a limited partnership. The two partnership forms had a higher
concentration of firms in the lower tail of capitalization, however. The largest firms overall
organized as corporations, followed by share partnerships.
Table 2 shows a heavy concentration of commercial companies in all enterprise forms,
though they were much more common among partnerships than corporations. The choice of
enterprise forms differs little across sector. Three exceptions, cotton manufacturing, finance,
and land companies, did attract a higher share of corporations, likely due to the larger capital
needs of these industries.
4 A Model of Partnerships as Experimentation
This section develops a model based on a multi-armed bandit framework. Agents match
anonymously and each pair is an “arm” that produces a flow return every period. Multi-
17Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) show that out of the 4,549 French general partnerships registered in
the Paris newspaper of record, Gazette des tribunaux, between 1832 and 1843, about 80 percent consisted of
2 partners and 15 percent comprised 3. Similarly, out of the 1,167 sociétés en commandite simple registered
in the same gazette, 65 percent featured a single general partner, and 30 percent had 2 general partners. See
pp. 38–39.
18Kuran (2010) corroborates the previous literature on the subject by providing more systematic evidence
on partnerships in seventeenth-century Istanbul; also see Inalcik (1969) on partnerships in Bursa, and Gedikli
(1998) on more general organizational practices in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire.
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armed bandits have a number of applications, including research and development, invest-
ment, as well as labor markets.19 The model here adapts the classic multi-armed bandit
approach to better understand dynamics of partnership formation and dissolution. We ap-
ply this framework to the partnership setting, offering two innovations. The choice of legal
form pins down dissolution costs, and we endogenize dissolution costs by allowing partners
to chose their legal form. The learning mechanism described by the multi-armed bandit
setting explains the otherwise puzzling high attrition rate for young partnerships. An alter-
native account – that dissolutions reflect idiosyncratic shocks – might account for the higher
dissolution rate for partnerships, but not the age-pattern of that risk. The model uses this
insight to demonstrate that low dissolution costs present a trade-off: they aid learning and
experimentation, allowing agents to try out several partners and sort into more productive
matches. But low dissolution costs can limit investment in companies that are good matches
by reducing incentives for within-company cooperation.
We begin with a benchmark setting in which agents in a partnership simply receive flow
payoffs with some probability. Later, we enrich the model by allowing agents to play a dy-
namic prisoner’s dilemma. This extension establishes a trade-off between ease of dissolution
and cooperation. New matches at the “exploration” stage find low dissolution costs desirable,
since the agents prefer to dissolve and move on to better matches if they find the current
match to be of poor quality. Established matches at the “exploitation” stage, on the other
hand, prefer higher dissolution costs to discourage partners from taking their outside option
and thus encourage cooperation and investment within that match. Propositions 1 and 2
formalize these results. We present a simple Monte Carlo to show the shape of the hazard
functions for dissolution and to better illustrate the comparative statics.
19See Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) for an overview of the framework’s applications.
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4.1 The Benchmark Model
The economy has a continuum of identical agents. Agents would like to form pairs to under-
take a joint venture, which produces a surplus that depends on partners’ complementarity.
✓ denotes each pair’s complementarity and is identically and independently drawn from a
distribution F with full support on the unit interval. Neither partner is informed about the
true value of ✓, but the distribution function F is common knowledge. Let t index the firm’s
age. A partnership’s flow of rewards follows an i.i.d. Bernoulli process; each partner receives
reward xt = 1 with probability ✓ and nothing otherwise. There are infinitely many discrete
periods. Agents share a common discount factor   2 (0, 1) over time. The timing in each
period is as follows:
1. Each agent in an existing partnership decides whether to dissolve the firm or not. Each
agent incurs a cost d > 0 if they dissolve the partnership.
2. Every agent without a partner is matched. Matches are one-to-one.
3. For each new match, ✓ is drawn.
4. Each partner receives payoff xt, which follows a Bernoulli process with the unobserved
parameter ✓. Agents observe their payoffs and update their posteriors.
The equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect in symmetric strategies. Let ⇡0 denote the
common prior belief on ✓. The state variable in each period is the posterior belief ⇡ on ✓.
⇡ describes agents’ best prediction of what ✓ is based on the initial distribution F and the
string of successes and failures they have observed. Agents use Bayes’ Rule to update the
posterior beliefs on the distribution in each period the partnership is active. ⇡ is a sufficient
statistic that summarizes the information agents share after t trials. Strategies are defined
as   : [0, 1]!4 ({0, 1}), a mapping from posterior expectations into a mixture over leaving
the partnership 0, or doing one more trial, 1.
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In a multi-armed bandit problem, the Gittins index identifies the constant stream of
rewards for which an agent is indifferent between doing one more trial in the experiment
or stopping to receive the constant reward forever. Thus the Gittins index describes the
optimal strategy in this environment.20 Let m be some real constant. V (⇡,m) denotes the
agent’s value function given posterior ⇡ :.
V (⇡,m) = max
⇢
m




The Gittins index m (⇡) solves
m (⇡)
1    = E [x+  V (⇡
0,m) |⇡] . (2)
The partnership formation and dissolution model described here pertains to an environment
where an agent chooses between infinitely many arms with no recall. Partners can either
continue experimenting with the current arm (their partnership), or switch to a completely
new arm (form a new partnership with a different match). The associated Gittins indices
are m (⇡) and m (⇡0), respectively, where ⇡0 := E✓ denotes the prior belief on ✓ at the time
of the match. Note that each unsampled arm, or partnership, is identical from each agent’s
perspective. The current partnership continues so long asm (⇡) / (1   ) > m (⇡0) / (1   ) 
d. Proposition 1 characterizes the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium in symmetric strategies.
Proposition 1. In the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of the game, agents dissolve the
partnership if the Gittins index associated with their match is less than the Gittins index of
a potential match.
Proof. The proof follows from Bergemann and Välimäki (2001), who show that the Gittins
index rule is the optimal policy for a multi-armed bandit model with infinitely many arms
and a one-time switching cost.
20See Gittins and Jones (1974) for the original formulation.
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Proposition 1 shows that in the unique symmetric equilibrium, each partnership goes
through a trial period. Partners who observe enough failures among the successes become
pessimistic about their association’s future prospects and dissolve the partnership.
The model implies considerable partnership churning, and that churning is optimal. If
partners could not dissolve these associations at will, they might become stuck in unpro-
ductive ventures for some periods of time. The unproductive ventures would depress over-
all surplus in the economy due to the opportunity cost of unrealized but more productive
matches. As the dissolution cost d increases, partnerships become more stable, as the Gittins
index for a new match m (⇡0) / (1   ) d falls. With higher dissolution costs, each matched
pair must observe relatively more failures before dissolving the partnership. High dissolution
costs lock the parties into associations that they would have optimally dissolved otherwise,
reducing the chances of a more complementary match.
4.2 Inducing Investment
All dissolutions in the benchmark model are timely and beneficial. The corporation becomes
a dead-weight loss and commitment is worthless. Partners remain in their current match so
long as that match’s expected productivity exceeds that of other potential matches. This
subsection provides a richer framework by introducing strategic actions in the stage game,
providing a clear trade-off between ease of dissolution and commitment.
Suppose that in each period, agents can decide whether to undertake a costly investment
action. Investment decisions are uncooperative and the investing partner alone bears the
cost c > 0. If neither agent undertakes the investment, the flow payoffs are xt for each agent.
If only one agent invests, the partnership produces the flow rx for both, but the investor
pays a cost of c. If both agents invest, each receives Rx  c. The flow variable x follows the
Bernoulli process depending on the unobserved match quality ✓.
The timing in each period is adjusted as follows:
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1. Each agent in an existing partnership decides whether to dissolve the firm or not. Each
agent incurs a cost d > 0 if they dissolve the partnership.
2. Every agent without a partner is matched. Matches are one-to-one.
3. For each new match, ✓ is drawn.
4. Agents simultaneously decide whether to invest or not invest.
5. Each partner receives payoff xt, which follows a Bernoulli process with the unobserved
parameter ✓. Agents observe their payoffs and update their posteriors.
Assumption 1. c/2 < R  r < c and R  1 > c
Assumption 1 ensures that for partnerships with high enough quality ✓, joint investment is
socially efficient. Since the stage game is a prisoner’s dilemma, however, the partnership
might not be sustained outside of a repeated game. We now have a situation in which
commitment has value. Later on, we show that with sufficiently small dissolution cost,
match-specific punishment mechanisms cannot induce cooperation since the defecting party
can just take his outside option. We assume that partners can observe investment decisions
(hence, future plays can be conditioned on the history of investment decisions), but are
unverifiable and thus cannot be enforced by a third party.21
Throughout the rest of this analysis, we focus on subgame perfect equilibria in pure,
symmetric strategies. In this setting, Markov Perfection has no meaningful effect since the
payoff-relevant state, namely the posterior belief ⇡, is insufficient to sustain cooperation as
an equilibrium.22 At the cost of creating a multitude of equilibria, subgame perfection allows
21The model presented here is closely related to McAdams (2011), who proves the existence of a joint-
welfare maximizing subgame perfect equilibrium in a more general repeated prisoner’s dilemma with hetero-
geneous agents and re-matching when partnership productivity is serially correlated. Our posterior belief
⇡resembles the payoff-relevant random variable in McAdams (2011). But we make the learning component
more explicit and focus on the dissolution costs. We also introduce an explicit choice to raise the cost of
dissolution by deciding to organize the firm as a partnership or a corporation.
22Markov Perfection is still viable if the timing is adjusted appropriately by allowing current investment
decisions to affect future payoffs (in particular, by making stage payoffs exclusively depend on lagged invest-
ment decisions) or by introducing asynchronous investment actions to which agents can react. See Maskin
and Tirole (1988) as an example.
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history-dependent strategies that can facilitate cooperation in equilibrium. We focus on the
subgame perfect equilibria that can most easily sustain investment, which is also the ex ante
welfare maximizing equilibrium.
The expanded model becomes a multi-armed bandit superprocess. Each agent is not
merely experimenting with each “arm” but also considers an action that affects the arm’s
payoffs. Whittle (1980) shows that the Gittins index policy is usually not optimal for multi-
armed bandit superprocesses unless the dominant action in each arm is independent of the
“retirement” value, i.e. the constant stream of rewards to which one compares each arm’s
continuation payoff. The independence condition fails in this current model, however, as the
optimal decision to invest depends on the state variable ⇡ and the outside option. Regardless,
the equilibrium still features a similar cutoff strategy.
Before exploring the more general case, we use a simplified version with two types to
illustrate the basic insight. Suppose ✓ 2 {L,H} where agents share a common prior that ✓ =
H with probability ⇡0. Matches of high quality H produce a positive surplus with probability
q. Low matches, those with ✓ = L, never produce a positive surplus. Thus, as long as partners
observe a failure, beliefs ⇡ decay according to Bayes’ Rule: ⇡0 = ⇡ (1  q) / (1  ⇡q). If there
is a success, then agents know the match quality to be H with certainty.
Suppose there is no investment action at all. Then the setting reduces to a simpler
version of the previous environment. Let V (⇡) denote the continuation payoff of an agent
in equilibrium conditional on belief ⇡. The continuation payoff of each agent can be written
as
V (⇡) = max
⇢





where V (1) = q/ (1   ). This is essentially an optimal stopping problem and dynamic
programming reveals a cutoff ⇡¯d below which agents dissolve the partnership and re-match.
The critical ⇡¯d can be recovered by setting V (⇡¯d) = V (⇡¯d (1  q) / (1  ⇡¯dq)) = V (⇡0)   d
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and solving for ⇡¯d:
⇡¯d =
(1   ) (V (⇡0)  d)
q [1 +   (V (1)  V (⇡0) + d)] .
Both V (1) and V (⇡0) remain constant across all matches regardless of their current pos-
teriors. In the extreme case of d = 0, agents immediately dissolve the firm if their first
observation is a failure.
Suppose now that agents can undertake an investment as described above. Assume that
⇡0q (R  1)   c < 0, that is, investment is not efficient for any match if the match has no
information in addition to the common prior. Sufficiently low dissolution costs with the
re-matching option deters partners from investing even after they observe a success. Again,
start with the extreme case of d = 0. If agents invest on the equilibrium path when ⇡ = 1,
then V (1) = (Rq   c) / (1   ) and





+ (1  ⇡0q)  V (⇡0)
which we can solve to find
V (⇡0) =
⇡0q [1    (1 Rq + c)]
(1   ) [1    (1  ⇡0q)] .
Note that investment actions following the realization of a success raise the value of both this
match and possible re-matching, since V (⇡0) = ⇡0q2 / {(1   ) [1    (1  ⇡0q)]}. Defection
from investment can only be deterred if the stage-game benefit followed by the continu-
ation payoff of taking re-matching is less than the continuation payoff of complying with
investment. That is, an equilibrium in which both agents invest requires
rq +  
⇢
⇡0q [1    (1 Rq + c)]
(1   ) [1    (1  ⇡0q)]
 
  Rq   c
1    .
This condition cannot be satisfied if c or ⇡0 are sufficiently large relative to q (R  r). If
1 < ⇡0 (1 + c  q (R  r)), then the set of discount factors   that can support investment in
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a model with re-matching is smaller than the one without that option. If the likelihood of
good matches increases, dissolving the firm becomes more attractive. Since each new match
is anonymous, all partnership-specific history is lost in the new match. Thus, a defector
cannot be punished in any re-match. Some friction is necessary to encourage investment,
either through a positive cost of switching or through decreasing the likelihood of getting a
good re-match. As the cost of dissolution increases, the constraint that the outside option
of re-matching imposes becomes slacker.
Suppose that investment cannot be induced but partners have the option to incorporate.
Incorporation in this setting raises the dissolution cost arbitrarily high. This assumption
removes the re-matching option and deviations from cooperation can be punished within the
partnership. New matches are not willing to incorporate. At this point, the match quality is
uncertain. Agents prefer to observe a few trials and have the option to quit so that they can
sort into matches with better quality. Once they observe a success, all uncertainty is removed.
In this case, partners prefer to pay a one-time sunk cost , less than q (R  1) / (1   ) to
transform their enterprise into a corporation. Hence, the model has an equilibrium of the
following type: partners shirk so long as there are no successes, they quit after a critical
number of failure, but they incorporate and invest after observing a success.
More nuanced results are possible if the model introduces some heterogeneity to part-
nerships. For instance, if the return from investment R differs across matches, then there
will be matches that can sustain investment without incorporating. These firms receive no
further benefit from the corporate form since the stage payoffs are high enough to stave off
any deviation. In equilibrium, we will observe associations that survive the experimenta-
tion period and are organized as either partnerships or as corporations depending on the
underlying parameters.
Now suppose that match type can take any value on the unit interval as in the benchmark.
We make the following assumption on prior beliefs and returns to investment.
Assumption 2. ⇡0 < min {c/ (R  1) , [R  (1   ) r   c+   (1   ) d] / [  (1 + c+ r  R   d)]}
22
Assumption 2 implies that investment is socially inefficient if partners have no information
beyond the prior. Furthermore, investment can be incentive-compatible if partners believe
that ✓ = 1. If the first part of the assumption is violated, the problem becomes trivial as
every match starts investing. If the second part of the assumption fails, no partnership can
sustain investment in equilibrium
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. There exists a subgame perfect equilib-
rium with cutoff strategies such that
(i) both partners invest if ⇡   ⇡⇤d,
(ii) both partners shirk if ⇡¯d  ⇡ < ⇡⇤d,
(iii) both partners exit if ⇡ < ⇡¯d,
and shirk and exit off the equilibrium path for some ⇡¯d < ⇡⇤d, both decreasing in d.
Proof. The proof follows from McAdams (2011). Belief ⇡ is the payoff-relevant state variable.
Continuation payoffs are weakly increasing in ⇡. In this formulation, ⇡⇤d and ⇡¯d describe the
work and exit thresholds of McAdams (2011). For a sketch of the proof, consider the value
of deviation from investment. To induce investment, we need
R⇡   c+  E [V (⇡0) |⇡]   r⇡ +  max V (⇡0)  d, V off (⇡0|⇡) (3)
where V off (·) denotes the continuation value of partnership-specific punishment off-the-
equilibrium-path. An example is the trigger strategy, the harshest punishment the partners
can devise. Since all potential re-matches are the same from an ex ante point of view,
equilibirum behavior pins down the constant V (p). Within-partnership punishment’s value
increases in ⇡. For lower values of ⇡, taking the outside option yields higher payoffs. Invest-
ment is incentive-compatible only if the continuation value of complying with investment
exceeds that of defecting once and re-matching. For sufficiently high ⇡, this will indeed be
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the case. The dissolution cost here acts as additional friction. An increase in the dissolution
cost lowers the value of re-matching, and reduces the exit cutoff ⇡¯d. By lowering the outside
option, it also makes the investment constraint slacker, allowing investment to take place for
lower values of belief ⇡. Hence, ⇡⇤d is also decreasing in d.
Proposition 2 shows that cooperation within the partnership is possible if partners be-
lieve that the match quality is reasonably high so that no agent has a profitable deviation
of shirking in any one stage and then rematching. Thus, partnerships will follow an ex-
perimentation or “exploration” period in which partners make no investment. At this point,
partners learn about the productivity of their respective matches. The longer they stay in the
partnership, the more informed they become about their joint productivity. Given a high
enough match quality, the partnership transitions into an “exploitation” phase where the
outside option has less bite and each partner starts undertaking investments. The shadow
of breaking up and rematching determines the cooperation threshold. Low dissolution costs
can delay investments even when it is efficient to cooperate.
Some partnerships will never invest or incorporate on the equilibrium path, so long as
incorporation is costly. These partnerships have more modest match qualities that yield
higher continuation payoffs than a rematch, but they cannot deter deviation from under-
taking investment. The ease of dissolution and the availability of potential matches create
incentives for commitment if agents believe their joint productivity is sufficiently high, but
still not high enough to avert defections from investment. Such conditions will arise when, for
instance, the trigger strategy can sustain cooperation but defection followed by re-matching
yields a higher continuation payoff than the trigger punishment. These partners make an
irreversible payment to incorporate their firm and raise the dissolution cost prohibitively
high to make within-firm punishments stronger. The intuition resembles the classic mod-
els of non-stochastic dynamic games with re-matching (see Kranton 1996 and Carmichael
and MacLeod 1997). In these models, players who defect and quit must be punished in
order to induce cooperation. However, anonymous matching prevents punishment as players
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cannot condition their strategies on partners’ histories in previous matches. Some friction
in re-matching becomes necessary to discourage defections, which a higher dissolution cost
fulfills.
Corollary 1. There exists a cutoff ⇡ˆd such that partnerships with beliefs ⇡ 2 [⇡ˆd, ⇡⇤d] will
“incorporate” and irreversibly make the dissolution cost arbitrarily large for some one-time
cost of .
Proof. Incorporation requires an irreversible cost that turns the equilibrium path behavior
into an optimal stopping problem. Matches that incorporate can no longer exercise the
option to re-match; these firms can freely devise any within-firm punishment mechanism in
order to deter defection. Let U (⇡) denote the continuation payoff after incorporation. Each
agent will invest if
R⇡   c+  E [U (⇡0) |⇡]   r⇡ +  ⇡
1    (4)
assuming agents play the trigger strategy. Note that, for low enough d, this constraint
will be slacker than the inequality without incorporation. Thus, incorporated matches can
sustain cooperation for an expanded set of beliefs and will receive higher continuation payoffs.
Matches with sufficiently high posteriors ⇡ can sustain cooperation without investment. By
incorporating, these firms will not gain any boost to their stage payoffs and will lose the
option to exit in the unlikely event of drawing a long sequence of failures.
For dissolution costs close to zero, most firms dissolve quickly as the cutoff ⇡¯d is high.The
possibility of dissolving and re-matching makes investment unsustainable for most matches.
As the dissolution cost increases these cutoffs fall. Investment becomes a feasible strategy
for a larger set of posterior beliefs and match qualities. Partnerships with beliefs between
⇡ˆ and ⇡⇤ are willing to pay at most the difference in their continuation payoffs between
cooperation and shirking in order to raise the dissolution cost and end up in the set of
firms that undertake the investment. Firms with posteriors close to 1 have little incentive to
incorporate; high match quality supports within-firm punishments strong enough to induce
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cooperation regardless of re-matching threats. These partnerships have the long lives of
corporations without endogenously chosing a higher dissolution cost.
An exogenous, higher dissolution cost lowers ex ante welfare, as McAdams (2011) shows.
High dissolution costs lead to investment sooner in all matches. However, the higher cost dis-
courages experimentation with new partners. This is the negative effect on sorting. If agents
can endogenously choose to shut down their outside option in cases where they wouldn’t
have dissolved the partnership anyway, they can achieve higher continuation payoffs than
before. Increasing the dissolution cost endogenously has two effects on other equilibrium
behavior. The option to incorporate further raises the value of each potential re-match but
also raises the value of experimentation in the current match. Depending on which effect
dominates, the cutoff ⇡¯d can fall or rise when the option to incorporate becomes available.
The model thus has several predictions critical for enterprise formation, dissolution, and
choice of form. First, agents will prefer to organize their enterprises as partnerships absent
any additional signal about quality. Second, these partnerships will display a single peak
in their dissolution risk, concentrated within the first few “years” of formation. Third, the
surviving partnerships will be stable and undertake more investment in the firm. Fourth,
partnerships whose “true” match quality is better than potential matches, but not high
enough to sustain cooperation, will find it profitable to incorporate in order to commit
partners to investment.
4.3 Model Simulations
To explore the model’s implications we simulate partnership formations and dissolutions
based on the benchmark model with no investment. We create 10,000 partners who are
matched and re-matched, implying a stable stock of 5,000 partnerships at any given time.
The time horizon is T = 240, where each period broadly represents one “month.” Match
quality ✓ has a beta distribution with parameters ↵ = 50 and   = 10. The common discount
factor is   = 0.99. We assume an exogenous dissolution cost of d = 0.035. These numbers
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best replicate the empirical evidence we present in Section 5. The general shape of the
simulated risk profile remains robust to other parameter specifications.
According to Proposition 1, each partner optimally dissolves their match if the Gittins
index mt (↵t,  t) associated with their association is lower than a potential partnership’s,
m0 (↵,  ) = m0 (50, 10). Partners update their posterior beliefs about ✓ at the end of each
period. After t trials, they dissolve the partnership if agents believe that their firm’s perfor-
mance falls short of what they expect to receive in a new match.23
The first graph in Figure 4 shows the hazard rate for firm dissolution associated with
this simulation. Firms dissolve mostly in the first two “years.” A partnership is “safe”
immediately after its foundation. After a small trial period, agents have a better idea about
the firm’s productivity and decide to dissolve the partnership if they are pessimistic about
their enterprise’s performance. Conditional on surviving this experimentation, partnerships
become much less likely to dissolve.
The simulation exercise also illustrates two comparative static implications. The second
graph in Figure 4 compares hazard rates for two different assumed dissolution costs, c0 =
0.047 > 0.035 = c. Higher dissolution costs make partnerships more stable overall, reducing
and delaying the early dissolution peak. This stability is suboptimal; partners might have
better potential matches in expectation but remain in their current match due to the higher
cost of breaking up.
The third graph in Figure 5 shows the case where agents have observed two “successes”
prior to the game’s start and thus believe their match has high quality. These initial matches
are more stable, in this case, optimally so. This comparison is especially relevant for family
23Calculating the Gittins index is a complicated problem and there is no general analytical solution.
However, there are many algorithms to approximate indices and solve value functions numerically. This
simulation uses a closed form approximation. Whittle (1982) shows that, for large enough ↵+   and  , the
Gittins index of a Bernoulli sampling process is approximately


















+ ↵↵+    12
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firms and partnerships whose partners had been in business together before. These matches
have stronger signals on their joint productivity and the partnership creates less informational
content for these agents.
5 Testing the Model
Propositions 1 and 2 in the previous subsection show that partnerships often do not survive
their first years because their owners do not have sufficient information about the quality of
their matches. The model also predicts that partners who start with more information on
each other create more durable enterprises. This section uses the Egyptian firm data to test
these and other implications of our model.
Figure 5 plots the Kaplan-Meier survival function separately for partnerships and corpo-
rations for the first ten years of their existence. Partnerships display a convex survival rate,
with about 30 percent of firms dissolving within the first year. The more stable corporations
last much longer and their dissolution rates are more constant over time.
The data have several observable characteristics that indicate whether partners knew
each other when they created their firm. To understand how important these characteristics
are, we need to hold constant other features such as firm size. Thus we require a regression
framework. We experimented with several approaches, including parametric failure-time
models. These models require nontrivial functional-form assumptions we would prefer to
avoid. Here we focus on more robust models that treat survival to a certain duration (such as
five years) as a binary outcome. The appendix presents alternative specifications, including
robustness checks for the binary models explored here, as well as parametric failure-time
models. The main results are robust to reasonable alternative approaches. Table 4 reports
linear probability models in which the dependent variable takes a value of one when the
firm survives to at least the specified age. We stress five-year survival; the table also reports
results for two-year survival, and the appendix shows results for other durations. Table 4
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illustrates two unavoidable data issues. Many firms do not report their capitalization when
they form. We estimate models with and without this regressor, and also estimate models
constrained to the sub-sample lacking the capitalization data. The capitalization variable
issue does not affect our primary result. The second data issue reflects the lack of de-
registration information for some firms, noted in section 4 above. We present results for two
different treatments of this issue, but stress the specification that simply drops these firms,
which amounts to assuming these firms never operated. The Appendix presents robustness
checks for alternative assumptions.
All specifications include controls for the firm’s sector and the year it formed.24 We
include one dummy for firms that have a single general partner, and another for the small
number of firms that have three or more. For corporations we code these variables as zero,
so these dummies are implicitly interacted with a dummy for a form other than corporation.
The reference firm for these variables is a two-person general partnership.
The next seven regressors test the role of information and experimentation in the firm’s
durability. We expect family firms to last longer, both because the owners know more about
each other and because of the implicit co-insurance commitment within the family. If a
firm has two (or more) owners who have been in business together before, then there should
be more information and the firm will last longer. However, to distinguish between this
effect and the implications of just having experienced owners, we include another dummy for
firms where two or more owners have been part of a previous firm in our data, regardless of
whether they were in business together. Thus “in business together before” captures the pure
effect of information about a specific pair. Because many family members form more than
one business, we also include a control that interacts “in business together before” with the
family-firm dummy. We include three more regressors that categorize the owners’ ethnicity.
A firm can have heterogeneous owners, including at least one Muslim; be all Muslim; or be
heterogeneous without any Muslims (for example, Greeks and Jews). The reference category
24The appendix reports the full model for the results presented in Table A1.
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for these variables is a firm consisting of a homogenous group of unrelated non-Muslims (for
example, all Armenians) that lacks at least two partners with prior business experience.
Firms with more capital survive longer, as expected. But the second and third models
reported in Table 4 do not differ appreciably in the estimates of interest. Being a corporation
or share partnership greatly increases survival chances; share partnerships also last longer,
although the effect is smaller. Having only one general partner also increases survival for
limited partnerships. The sector dummies (not reported in Table 4, but in Appendix Table
A1) indicate that mines and other firms that would suffer heavily from untimely dissolution
last longer. These effects, however, differ across the first three specifications. The year-
of-formation controls are collectively statistically significant, but there are no meaningful
patterns in those estimates.25
Family firms endured, as the model implies. This result holds even when we consider the
combined effect of being a family firm and having partners with business experience. A firm
with two owners who have been in business together before also has a greater survival chance,
although this effect is not always precisely estimated. When we also take into account that
partners who have been in business together before are also more experienced business people,
this family effect declines. Family members who have been in business before contribute less
to the firm’s survival; depending on the specification, this point estimate completely offsets
the effect of prior co-ownership. This result is to be expected, since family members acquire
less (additional) information about one another from experimentation.
The ethnicity results also conform to expectations. Members of the small Muslim busi-
ness community knew each other, and had little reason to experiment; their firms endured.
25In general, for models that include capitalization as a regressor, the sector dummies are not collectively
significant. The sector effects are, on the other hand, significant for models that lack capitalization as a
regressor. For the first model reported in Table 4, the F-statistic for the null hypothesis that all sector
dummies are zero has a value of 1.5, which with degrees of freedom 10 and 5673 has a “p-valule” of 0.134.
For the second model reported in that table, F (10, 475) = 9.15, and we can reject the null at at conventional
confidence level. The year-of-formation dummies, on the other hand, are always collectively significant; for
the first two models reported in Table 4, F (28, 5673) = 11.07 for the first model and 14.5 for the second.
This general pattern holds for all models reported in Table 4 and in the appendix.
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Business formed out of combinations of other groups had much learning to do, and the
required experimentation led to firm break-up.
6 Conclusion
The model and data have three important implications for firm longevity and enterprise
form. First, general and limited partnerships indeed have shorter lives than corporations,
even after we control for capitalization, sector, and other characteristics that might affect
longevity. Most of the dissolution risk for partnerships, however, comes in the first two years
after the firm’s establishment. Conditional on lasting two years, enterprise form matters less
for surviving for five or more years.
Second, the observed dissolution patterns support the model’s core idea: forming part-
nership reflects a process of experimentation with other investors whose ability cannot be
observed perfectly. When two investors come from the same family, they have more prior
information on each other, and their enterprise more likely endures. Similarly, when two in-
dividuals have been in business together before, they have a clearer idea of their suitability as
partners in a business enterprise, and their firm lasts. These two effects partially substitute
for one another; for family firms, the presence of a pair with prior joint experience matters
less than for non-family firms. The extreme ethnic diversity of Egypt’s business community
offers other clues to this effect. Firms created out of homogeneous partners endure, because
these individuals knew each other. Other firms (perhaps created to capitalize on the gains
from trade implicit in diversity) often do not last, because the partners went into the venture
without knowing each other well.
Third, this experimentation is beneficial. Consider the following counterfactual. If these
forms could not be dissolved easily, then partners would have been stuck in unproductive
ventures. Anticipating that result, agents would be less willing to enter into enterprises, de-
pressing capital pooling and business activity as people waited for additional signals before
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establishing a multi-owner enterprise. Not all dissolutions, however, add to social welfare.
Ease of dissolution depresses investment because partners cannot commit fully to the enter-
prise: some productive firms cannot survive without a way to lock-in the investments.
The partnership form lies itself at the heart of this trade-off. Rather than an unambigu-
ously restrictive, inferior way of business organization, the partnership offers the best choice
for agents who prefer not to lock capital in ventures that might turn out to be unproductive.
It allows agents to trade off learning against larger investment. Agents without strong priors
on the match quality prefer to organize as “small” partnerships (in the sense that both play
“not invest” in the stage game). Agents who have received stronger signals about the match
quality prefer incorporation, when possible, because this form induces investment. Some
partnerships become suitable for incorporation after the trial period. The model also shows
that some firms will never incorporate. These partnerships have such high match produc-
tivities that within-partnership punishments are still more valuable than the outside option
of re-matching; these firms can sustain cooperation without raising the cost of dissolution.
This explains why the preponderance of partnerships that survived the initial trial period,
especially family companies, operated for decades without incorporating.
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One or more unlimitedly liable partners.
One or more partners with limited








One or more unlimitedly liable partners.
One or more partners with limited
liability.
Special partners can have a board to
monitor the ordinary partners, otherwise
do not participate in management.
Special partners’ shares can be traded on
the market.
Société anonyme Corporation Seven or more members.
All members have limited liability.
Members’ shares are tradable.
Requires special permission from the
government.
Single board of directors with at least
three members.
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Table 2: Multi-Owned Enterprises: Summary Statistics
General Limited Ltd partnership Corporation
partnership partnership with shares
Court of registration (column %)
Alexandria 45.16 52.18 46.49 50.33
Cairo 50.10 44.69 51.50 48.58
Mansoura 4.73 3.13 2.01 1.09
Number of partners
General 2.42 1.46 1.61
partners (0.82) (0.71) (1.63)




Firm capital (100,000s of 2010 £)
Overall 3.12 3.76 12.48 36.93
(18.64) (18.09) (32.65) (75.66)
[0.0031, 665.94] [0.0315, 788.31] [0.1774, 500.97] [0.0054, 655.79]
Per partner 1.30 1.10
(8.61) (2.51)
[0.0010, 332.97] [0.0113, 79.02]
Partner characteristics (column %)
Muslim 9.67 7.10 14.38 15.28
Mixed 29.10 12.92 20.07 87.99
Family 28.40 13.05 11.37 10.92
Family-2 28.40 28.28 25.47
Industry (column %)
Wholesale/retail 55.34 59.00 37.79 25.55
Manufacturing 16.41 15.50 30.10 33.62
Finance 1.87 2.49 8.03 7.86
Other 26.38 23.01 24.08 32.97
Notes: Where applicable, standard deviations are reported in parentheses, minimums and maximums are
reported in brackets. The variable “Muslim” indicates whether the partnership has at least one Muslim
partner. “Mixed” denotes companies in which at least two general partners (for partnerships) or founders
(for corporations) have different ethno-religious backgrounds. “Family-2” restricts the sample to partnerships
with at least two general partners (matters only for limited partnerships and limited partnerships with
tradeable shares). The overall sample consists of 6,698 general partnerships, 5,180 limited partnerships,
299 limited partnerships with tradable shares, and 458 corporations. Initial capitalization was reported for
2,997 general partnerships, 3,164 limited partnerships, 283 limited partnerships with tradable shares, and
434 corporations.
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2 4,725 1,483 78
(70.9) (28.7) (26.1)
3 1,390 315 18
(20.9) (6.1) (6.0)
4 375 63 3
(5.6) (1.2) (0.7)
5 or more 173 21 7
(2.6) (0.4) (2.3)
Total 6,663 5,168 299
Notes: Column percentages are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4: Linear Probability Estimates of Firm Survival
Estimates excluding firms with no survival information Incl firms with no survival info
Dependent variable 60 mo 60 mo 60 mo 24 mo 24 mo 24 mo 60 mo 60 mo 60 mo
Log capital 0.0142 0.0356 -0.0109
(0.00577) (0.00461) (0.00510)
Corporation 0.414 0.459 0.441 0.220 0.309 0.288 0.386 0.378 0.364
(0.0295) (0.0221) (0.0273) (0.0236) (0.0168) (0.0219) (0.0274) (0.0207) (0.0253)
Limited partnership -0.0385 -0.0342 -0.0313 -0.000634 -0.00447 0.0175 -0.0383 -0.0449 -0.0439
(0.0204) (0.0147) (0.0203) (0.0180) (0.0133) (0.0179) (0.0189) (0.0137) (0.0187)
Share partnership 0.119 0.145 0.144 0.0791 0.141 0.142 0.108 0.0846 0.0879
(0.0400) (0.0355) (0.0386) (0.0307) (0.0268) (0.0297) (0.0364) (0.0326) (0.0351)
Family firm 0.219 0.256 0.226 0.151 0.196 0.170 0.174 0.194 0.168
(0.0205) (0.0137) (0.0202) (0.0163) (0.0111) (0.0163) (0.0188) (0.0125) (0.0184)
2+ experienced owners -0.0531 -0.0206 -0.0448 -0.0451 -0.00481 -0.0244 -0.0749 -0.0573 -0.0821
(0.0235) (0.0173) (0.0233) (0.0210) (0.0156) (0.0209) (0.0227) (0.0166) (0.0223)
2+ in business together before 0.0683 0.0360 0.0704 0.0479 0.0343 0.0531 0.0590 0.0281 0.0580
(0.0313) (0.0257) (0.0314) (0.0275) (0.0231) (0.0276) (0.0305) (0.0248) (0.0305)
Family⇥2+ before -0.0579 -0.0768 -0.0585 -0.0421 -0.0508 -0.0437 -0.0275 -0.0441 -0.0272
(0.0489) (0.0378) (0.0488) (0.0381) (0.0302) (0.0377) (0.0471) (0.0365) (0.0471)
One general partner 0.0875 0.0866 0.0876 0.0415 0.0681 0.0418 0.0822 0.0871 0.0825
(0.0236) (0.0177) (0.0236) (0.0202) (0.0157) (0.0203) (0.0215) (0.0162) (0.0215)
3+ general partners -0.00780 -0.0108 -0.00378 -0.0303 -0.0195 -0.0203 0.00368 -0.0107 0.000476
(0.0210) (0.0140) (0.0210) (0.0183) (0.0126) (0.0183) (0.0190) (0.0129) (0.0189)
Muslim/heterogeneous firm -0.0136 -0.0176 -0.0130 -0.0481 -0.0510 -0.0466 0.0370 0.0294 0.0362
(0.0388) (0.0319) (0.0388) (0.0360) (0.0306) (0.0359) (0.0341) (0.0283) (0.0340)
Muslim/homogeneous firm 0.0694 0.0790 0.0767 -0.00239 0.0309 0.0160 0.129 0.126 0.125
(0.0312) (0.0218) (0.0310) (0.0263) (0.0184) (0.0262) (0.0243) (0.0171) (0.0243)
Non-Muslim/heterogeneous -0.0379 -0.0500 -0.0366 -0.0443 -0.0437 -0.0411 -0.0220 -0.0308 -0.0228
(0.0203) (0.0144) (0.0203) (0.0187) (0.0136) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0133) (0.0187)
Constant 0.204 0.244 0.361 0.262 0.550 0.654 0.631 0.315 0.513
(0.108) (0.0500) (0.0875) (0.0992) (0.0457) (0.0840) (0.0988) (0.0477) (0.0809)
Sub-sample limited to Firms with No Firms with Firms with No Firms with Firms with No Firms with
K data limit K data K data limit K data K data limit K data
Number of Observations 4,407 8,713 4,407 4,407 8,713 4,407 5,181 10,276 5,181
R-squared 0.107 0.099 0.106 0.079 0.071 0.068 0.077 0.072 0.076



































Figure 1: Formation and Dissolution, 1911–1948
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Figure 3: Capital Distribution by Enterprise Form
Notes: Capital is expressed as the logarithm of pounds sterling in 2010 prices. The upper horizontal axis
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Figure 4: Simulated Hazard Functions
Notes: The simulation assumes 10,000 agents who are matched over 240 periods, interpreting each period as
a month. The figure uses 12-period intervals, hence each unit of time represents one year. The probability
with which a partnership produces a positive reward is drawn from a beta distribution with parameters
↵ = 50 and   = 10. The common discount factor is   = 0.99. The baseline dissolution cost is c = 0.035, the
high dissolution cost c0 = 0.047. The prior information is equivalent to two observations of successes before
start.
43
Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate
Notes: The partnership category combines all three partnership forms (general, limited, and share).
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Figure 6: Hazard Rate Estimate




The database of multi-owned enterprises used in this paper includes information about all
partnerships and corporations that filed registration notices with the Mixed Courts of Egypt
between November 1910 and March 1949.
Registration notices
In 1875, Egyptian government adopted a new court system, the Mixed Courts, which applied
a slightly modified version of the existing French commercial code. The Mixed Courts’
purview included a variety of civil matters, but its competence in company law matters the
most for this paper. The new legal system introduced the French menu of enterprise forms,
consisting of general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited partnerships with tradeable
shares, and corporations.
As is the case in other countries that use French-style commercial law, any new part-
nership had to register their company with the commercial courts within two weeks of its
establishment. Similarly, the law required partners to register modifications to the equity
contract as well dissolutions. Starting from November 1910, the courts started to publish
notices of registration, modification, and deregistration in their official newspaper. Between
November 1910 to October 1921, contract summaries appeared in the montly newspaper
Gazette des Tribunaux Mixte d’Égypte (from now on, the Gazette). Publications switched
to a new periodical called Journal des Tribunaux Mixte d’Égypte (from now on, the Jour-
nal), which started out as a weekly, but then started to be released three times per week
after November 1923. The Journal continued disseminating company notices until March
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1949, when the Mixed Courts were abolished. Almost all notices were French, which was
the court’s official language. Exceptions were written in Italian or English.26
The registration notices give a great deal of information about partnership characteristics.
The following are available for almost every firm in the source material:
(1) Company name (raison sociale), which designates the legal name of the firm.27
(2) Company’s legal form
(3) Each and every general partner’s name
(4) If a corporation, each and every founder’s name
(5) The general partners who had the power to sign for the company
(6) The court in which the registration was filed (one of Alexandria, Cairo, or Mansoura)
(7) The legal head office
(8) The firm’s industry
(9) The contract date
(10) Start and termination dates of the company, with rules on renewal28
Two other pieces of data were available more sporadically: initial capitalization and the
number of limited partners. Limited partners’ name in a limited partnerships were almost
never disclosed, but this limitation does not affect our approach. In our empirical analysis,
we repeat estimations with and without using initial capitalization.
26The entirety of the first eleven years of the Gazette are digitized and online through the Hathi Trust. The
Journal is collected into multiple volumes (usually three volumes for each year) and is available physically
in many libraries. For this paper, we consulted and digitized the collection of the Yale Lillian Goldman Law
Library.
27Partnerships could operate under a designation, called “doing business as” name (dénomination), which
could be different from the company name. Registration notices did not have to disclose this information
but often did.
28Most firms could be renewed automatically and did not have to be re-registered
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Subsequent modification and dissolution notices sometimes repeated the same informa-
tion, but they mostly referred to the company name and nothing else. Modification notices
involved changes in owners (e.g. entry of a new owner, exit of a previous owner, etc.) or
changes to capitalization. We used the company names to match notices of the same com-
pany to construct the lifetime for each company with a start and end date, and any change
in between. We also coded an entry and exit date for each partner in each firm, imputed
an ethno-religious identity for each partner, and matched partners across partnerships using
their names. Figure A1 shows a registration, modification, and dissolution notice of com-
pany “H. Kaprielian, A. Deragopian & Co.” which had the doing-business name “Compagnie
Egyptienne.”
Commercial directories
This dataset uses a second, large-scale data collection effort: digitization of almost the
entire collection of the Egyptian Directory. These comprehensive commercial directories
were published annually from the early 1900s to the 1950s and beyond. The directories list
all active enterprises in Egypt and their addresses, usually with one-year lag. We used the
directory to check whether firms without deregistration notices actually survived, and to
make sure we matched partners across partnerships reliably. The last panel in Figure A1
shows “H. Kaprielian, A. Deragopian & Co.” in the directory.
The directories are rare and the entire span during our period of interest is not available.
We succeeded in collecting every volume between 1912 and 1950 except 1923, 1924, 1940,
1942, 1944, and 1946. All volumes are digitized using the collection of Bibliothèque nationale
de France, Paris, except 1919 (SALT Araştırma, Istanbul), 1927, 1939, 1943, 1945, 1947
(British Library, London), 1930, 1950 (New York Public Library), and 1941 (David Lisbona
and Roger Bilboul’s private collection).
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What is a distinct partnership?
Most firms have clear start and end dates. For some companies, especially family firms that
persist for a long time, the distinction between a new and a modified firm not so obvious.
Some companies go through incremental changes over their lifetime, adding new owners and
swapping out old partners for new owners. There are some other firms that dissolved and
were immediately reconstituted with the very same partners, company name, and objective.
Such firms were essentially renewals. We did not code a partnership as dissolved unless a
substantial change in ownership took place, which we define as a shift in half of all current
(not necessarily original) general partners. Our methodology implies that if the partnership
has two general partners, switching one of the general partners leads to the formation of a
new firm. If a firm is made up of three general partners, we do not consider the firm dissolved
as long as only one partner is swapped at a time.
Firms without notices of deregistration
While all firms had to file registration notices, dissolutions did not face the same requirement.
Many firms in the database did not actually deregister even though they dissolved. Many of
these companies let their contracts simply expire; others might have found little benefit in
going through deregistration process. Whatever the reason, we cannot simply assume firms
without any de-registration survived until 1950.
We have used the commercial directories to address this problem. The Egyptian Direc-
tory, like commercial directories in other countries, provides a comprehensive listing of all
businesses—whether single proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations—as well as part-
ners, civil societies, and other non-profit establishments. The directories provide a reliable
way to check whether a company that did not give a notice of de-registration actually sur-
vived. We checked every such company, recorded the last directory in which it appeared,
and coded a dissolution date based on this information. If a firm appeared in all directories
up to 1930, but did not appear in any directory from 1931 onwards, then we assumed it
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dissolved some time in 1930. Using companies with known deregistration dates, we checked
the accuracy of our method. In Alexandria, companies that were alive by November of year
t appeared in directory t + 1; in Cairo, enterprises active in March of year t appeared in
directory t.
Not all firms without deregistration actually appeared in a directory. A company might
fail to appear in a directory for several reasons:
(1) The company dissolved within a year; e.g. an Alexandrian firm that was formed in
December 1929 and dissolved in September 1930 would not appear in any directory.
(2) The company was “stillborn;” it filed its registration but it actually never functioned,
never made any subsequent publication, and ultimately, had never operated.
(3) The company was listed with its “doing business as” name, which was not reported
in the registration notice. Without knowing the doing-business name, we could not
locate the firm in the directory.
(4) The company always used a single owner’s name in the directory, preventing us from
distinguishing when it was a partnership and when a sole proprietorship
(5) We could not locate the company because of the variation in how owners’ names were
spelled in French; an important issue for all Greek and Arabic names
We address this issue by repeating our analysis for three different treatments of these com-
panies. Our preferred specification treats these companies as “stillborn” and excludes them
altogether. The second treatment assumes that all such companies dissolved with a year of
creation. The third case assumes that, despite not producing any sign of operation, these




This section presents a series of robustness checks aimed at two types of issues. The first set
of checks (Tables A3-A11) consider alternative specifications to see whether our modeling
decisions are driving the results. A second set of checks (Tables A12-A17) estimates a version
of the model presented in Table A1 for different sub-sets of firms. These exercises ensure
that our results are not driven by a minority of firms.
Tables A1 and A2 present the full models discussed in the text (4). Throughout this ap-
pendix, we retain the practice of estimating three versions of each model. First we estimate
the model including capitalization as a regressor. Because many firms do not report capital-
ization, these results may reflect selection bias. We next estimate the same model, dropping
the capitalization regressor, for the full sub-sample. Finally, we estimate the same model
(without capitalization) only for firms that have the capitalization data. This procedure
ensures that we can distinguish between the possible selection bias due to missing values for
capitalization on the one hand, and the potential omitted variables bias caused by dropping
the capitalization regressor. The point estimates for the other regressors do change slightly
across the various specifications, but there are no cases where the change materially affects
our results.
Duration for firm survival
In the text we present results for whether a firm survives five years and for two years. Table
A3 reports the same model as in Table A1 for three-year survival, while Table A4 reports the
model for one-year survival. Table A5 reports ten-year survival esimates. The differences
across the models in these four tables hold to a pattern we see in other checks. The most
important results for our purposes are quite robust. Corporations and share partnerships
outlast ordinary and limited partnerships. Family firms endure. Heterogeneous firms do not
last, while Muslim-only firms do. Other results do not change sign, but their magnitudes
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shift and sometimes they lose statistical significance. The most notable for our purposes is
the effect of having a pair with prior experience together. In Table A2, for example, this
effect is much stronger for the firms that report capitalization than for the full sample used
in the second model. For the ten-year duration (Table A5), on the other hand, the prior
joint experience variable has an especially large effect in all three specifications.
Starting date
Our only information on the prior history of the partners we observe comes from the database
itself. Thus the variables pertaining to prior experience cannot be constructed in the first
sample years. In the results reported in the text, as well as in all other results reported
here, we estimate the models for firms created in the period 1916-1945. The decision to
start in 1916 reflects the trade-off between possible measurement error on the one hand, and
reduction in sample size on the other. Table A6 reports a five-year survival model estimated
for firms created 1920-1945. This later starting date drops the World War I era, a period with
considerable churning in Egyptian firms. Table A7 reports an analogous two-year survival
model. There are no substantial differences in other regressors of interest, and the effects for
the variables dealing with prior partner history are substantially stronger than in the model
reported in the text.
Firms with no information after registration
Some firms did not file notice that they had gone out of business, and some of those we
could not identify in a directory, so we do not actually know when they ceased operation.
We believe that most such firms never really operated, which is why they did not appear in
a directory. In all other results reported here and in the text, we exclude such firms from the
estimation sub-sample. But we can check whether their inclusion matters. Tables A8-A11
include such firms. Tables A8 and A9 assume these firms operated until the end period for
the model (Table A8, five years, Table A9, two years), while Tables A10 and A11 assume
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the firms ceased operations before two years of business. The former assumption, of long
duration, is the least plausible, but the results do not change substantially when we use it.
In Tables A8 and A9 the impacts of interest are all smaller than in Tables A1 and A2, and
some lose statistical significance, but the core message remains the same.
Estimates for particular sub-sets of firms
Tables A12-A19 address the concern that our results might depend on particular kinds of
firms. To address this, we re-estimate models analogous to those present in Table A1, but
include only firms with specific characteristics. Table A12 uses only ordinary partnerships,
while A13 includes both ordinary and limited partnerships. The results we stress in the text
do not depend on the inclusion of corporations and share partnerships; the results here are
broadly similar to those in the analogous models that include all enterprise forms. The one
exception concerns the prior experience variables, which in A13 (ordinary partnerships only)
are very imprecisely estimated.
We next consider the role of firm sizes, splitting the sample at the median capitalization
(ln capital = 11.97). Table A14 reports models for firms with less than the median capital-
ization, while Table A15 reports results for the larger firms. (Note that in both A14 and
A15, because we are conditioning on capitalization, we have baked-in any possible selection
bias). Enterprise form, the family firm, and ethniticy results remain the same. The prior
experience variables, on the other hand, are stronger for smaller firms than for larger. This
may hint at the greater importance of match quality for smaller enterprises.
Finally, we consider the role of sector. In some activities (for example, mining) the firm
undertakes specific, long-term investments that make experimentation relatively costly. One
might ask how our results differ for firms in different sectors. All of the results presented in
the text, and here, control for sector. But Tables A16 and A17 report two additional checks
for the largest groups of firms in our data. Wholesale and retail enterprises (Table A16)
have lower dissolution costs than other firms; they invest most of their capital in inventory
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which is easily liquidated. About half of our firms fall into this category. Table A17 adds
service firms to the those included in A16. Service firms sell human capital; while specific
partnership matches may be important to them, they do not have capital that needs to be
locked in. They account for another 15 percent of our sample. Our results remain broadly
the same for these two checks. The prior experience effects, however, are very imprecisely
estimated.
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Table A1: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s60
ln(capital) 0.0142 (0.0058)
Corporation 0.4138 (0.0295) 0.4586 (0.0221) 0.4413 (0.0273)
Limited partnership -0.0385 (0.0204) -0.0342 (0.0147) -0.0313 (0.0203)
Share partnership 0.1193 (0.0400) 0.1452 (0.0355) 0.1443 (0.0386)
One general partner 0.0875 (0.0236) 0.0866 (0.0177) 0.0876 (0.0236)
3+ general partners -0.0078 (0.0210) -0.0108 (0.0140) -0.0038 (0.0210)
Family firm 0.2187 (0.0205) 0.2558 (0.0137) 0.2263 (0.0202)
2+ experienced partners -0.0531 (0.0235) -0.0206 (0.0173) -0.0448 (0.0233)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0683 (0.0313) 0.0360 (0.0257) 0.0704 (0.0314)
Prior joint⇥Family -0.0579 (0.0489) -0.0768 (0.0378) -0.0585 (0.0488)
Muslims + others -0.0136 (0.0388) -0.0176 (0.0319) -0.0130 (0.0388)
Only Muslims 0.0694 (0.0312) 0.0790 (0.0218) 0.0767 (0.0310)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0379 (0.0203) -0.0500 (0.0144) -0.0366 (0.0203)
Cairo 0.0123 (0.0151) 0.0305 (0.0106) 0.0115 (0.0151)
Mansoura 0.1343 (0.0350) 0.1154 (0.0259) 0.1284 (0.0349)
Construction 0.1234 (0.0831) 0.2174 (0.0434) 0.1320 (0.0835)
Cottton trade 0.1703 (0.0772) 0.2484 (0.0360) 0.1847 (0.0774)
Cotton manufacturing 0.0933 (0.1020) 0.2380 (0.0634) 0.1079 (0.1019)
Finance 0.2028 (0.0808) 0.2761 (0.0416) 0.2146 (0.0810)
Land 0.2465 (0.0905) 0.3437 (0.0587) 0.2583 (0.0908)
Manufacturing 0.1634 (0.0709) 0.2075 (0.0306) 0.1649 (0.0714)
Mining 0.2059 (0.1023) 0.2352 (0.0709) 0.2101 (0.1028)
Services 0.1304 (0.0713) 0.1824 (0.0306) 0.1292 (0.0718)
Transportation 0.1707 (0.0797) 0.2206 (0.0426) 0.1730 (0.0801)
Wholesale and retail 0.1535 (0.0694) 0.2159 (0.0283) 0.1536 (0.0700)
Founded1917 0.0008 (0.0695) 0.0479 (0.0554) 0.0030 (0.0698)
Founded1918 -0.1242 (0.0655) -0.0600 (0.0522) -0.1179 (0.0659)
Founded1919 -0.0647 (0.0651) -0.0369 (0.0482) -0.0587 (0.0654)
Founded1920 -0.0931 (0.0739) -0.0422 (0.0488) -0.0890 (0.0743)
Founded1921 -0.1019 (0.0793) -0.0061 (0.0538) -0.0964 (0.0796)
Founded1922 0.0408 (0.0726) 0.0069 (0.0507) 0.0429 (0.0730)
Founded1923 -0.1438 (0.0765) -0.0503 (0.0516) -0.1442 (0.0765)
Founded1924 -0.0422 (0.0725) -0.0208 (0.0495) -0.0377 (0.0728)
Founded1925 -0.1157 (0.0701) -0.0441 (0.0491) -0.1117 (0.0705)
Founded1926 -0.0947 (0.0732) -0.0520 (0.0506) -0.0902 (0.0735)
Founded1927 -0.0787 (0.0680) -0.0279 (0.0496) -0.0754 (0.0684)
Founded1928 -0.0565 (0.0700) 0.0455 (0.0501) -0.0523 (0.0702)
Founded1929 -0.0222 (0.0684) -0.0102 (0.0500) -0.0168 (0.0688)
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Founded1930 -0.0136 (0.0687) 0.0265 (0.0509) -0.0089 (0.0689)
Founded1931 -0.0412 (0.0701) -0.0227 (0.0523) -0.0364 (0.0706)
Founded1932 -0.0533 (0.0686) -0.0460 (0.0510) -0.0531 (0.0689)
Founded1933 0.0018 (0.0714) 0.0108 (0.0520) 0.0019 (0.0717)
Founded1934 -0.0874 (0.0664) -0.0088 (0.0503) -0.0859 (0.0668)
Founded1935 0.0049 (0.0658) 0.0444 (0.0488) 0.0029 (0.0660)
Founded1936 -0.0612 (0.0692) 0.0232 (0.0510) -0.0575 (0.0694)
Founded1937 0.0106 (0.0647) 0.0200 (0.0506) 0.0101 (0.0650)
Founded1938 0.0363 (0.0649) 0.0639 (0.0498) 0.0352 (0.0652)
Founded1939 0.0034 (0.0659) 0.0432 (0.0494) -0.0026 (0.0661)
Founded1940 -0.0079 (0.0649) 0.0513 (0.0489) -0.0116 (0.0652)
Founded1941 -0.0137 (0.0621) 0.0097 (0.0473) -0.0196 (0.0624)
Founded1942 -0.0400 (0.0622) 0.0176 (0.0480) -0.0401 (0.0625)
Founded1943 -0.0257 (0.0609) 0.0381 (0.0471) -0.0240 (0.0612)
Founded1944 -0.0164 (0.0612) 0.0374 (0.0476) -0.0143 (0.0615)
Founded1945 0.1350 (0.0590) 0.1642 (0.0468) 0.1369 (0.0594)
Constant 0.2037 (0.1076) 0.2436 (0.0500) 0.3609 (0.0875)
Observations 4,407 8,713 4,407
R-squared 0.1074 0.0985 0.1062
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Table A2: 24-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s24
ln(capital) 0.0356 (0.0046)
Corporation 0.2197 (0.0236) 0.3085 (0.0168) 0.2884 (0.0219)
Limited partnership -0.0006 (0.0180) -0.0045 (0.0133) 0.0175 (0.0179)
Share partnership 0.0791 (0.0307) 0.1405 (0.0268) 0.1416 (0.0297)
One general partner 0.0415 (0.0202) 0.0681 (0.0157) 0.0418 (0.0203)
3+ general partners -0.0303 (0.0183) -0.0195 (0.0126) -0.0203 (0.0183)
Family firm 0.1511 (0.0163) 0.1956 (0.0111) 0.1700 (0.0163)
2+ experienced partners -0.0451 (0.0210) -0.0048 (0.0156) -0.0244 (0.0209)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0479 (0.0275) 0.0343 (0.0231) 0.0531 (0.0276)
Prior joint firm⇥Family firm -0.0421 (0.0381) -0.0508 (0.0302) -0.0437 (0.0377)
Muslims + others -0.0481 (0.0360) -0.0510 (0.0306) -0.0466 (0.0359)
Only Muslims -0.0024 (0.0263) 0.0309 (0.0184) 0.0160 (0.0262)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0443 (0.0187) -0.0437 (0.0136) -0.0411 (0.0188)
Cairo -0.0010 (0.0130) 0.0202 (0.0094) -0.0030 (0.0130)
Mansoura 0.0734 (0.0299) 0.1180 (0.0209) 0.0587 (0.0302)
Construction 0.1090 (0.0841) 0.2016 (0.0416) 0.1304 (0.0843)
Cottton trade 0.0780 (0.0791) 0.2065 (0.0356) 0.1138 (0.0791)
Cotton manufacturing 0.0478 (0.0942) 0.2249 (0.0516) 0.0842 (0.0950)
Finance 0.1390 (0.0799) 0.2305 (0.0384) 0.1683 (0.0799)
Land 0.1284 (0.0833) 0.2485 (0.0473) 0.1579 (0.0841)
Manufacturing 0.1217 (0.0751) 0.1721 (0.0322) 0.1255 (0.0751)
Mining 0.1181 (0.0993) 0.1655 (0.0689) 0.1286 (0.0993)
Services 0.1318 (0.0754) 0.1658 (0.0323) 0.1288 (0.0754)
Transportation 0.0991 (0.0817) 0.1587 (0.0419) 0.1049 (0.0816)
Wholesale and retail 0.1268 (0.0741) 0.1847 (0.0305) 0.1270 (0.0741)
Founded1917 -0.0452 (0.0559) -0.0007 (0.0466) -0.0398 (0.0564)
Founded1918 -0.2383 (0.0558) -0.1607 (0.0467) -0.2226 (0.0562)
Founded1919 -0.1077 (0.0527) -0.0476 (0.0413) -0.0928 (0.0531)
Founded1920 -0.0697 (0.0584) -0.0872 (0.0422) -0.0595 (0.0591)
Founded1921 -0.1100 (0.0650) -0.0361 (0.0457) -0.0961 (0.0655)
Founded1922 -0.0355 (0.0571) -0.0720 (0.0439) -0.0304 (0.0575)
Founded1923 -0.1044 (0.0633) -0.1022 (0.0447) -0.1055 (0.0631)
Founded1924 -0.0614 (0.0574) -0.0884 (0.0431) -0.0502 (0.0579)
Founded1925 -0.0540 (0.0563) -0.0554 (0.0422) -0.0441 (0.0572)
Founded1926 -0.1099 (0.0609) -0.0729 (0.0434) -0.0988 (0.0610)
Founded1927 -0.1166 (0.0555) -0.0937 (0.0427) -0.1084 (0.0563)
Founded1928 -0.0861 (0.0563) -0.0174 (0.0422) -0.0756 (0.0568)
Founded1929 -0.0973 (0.0556) -0.1135 (0.0435) -0.0839 (0.0565)
Founded1930 -0.0722 (0.0544) -0.0392 (0.0431) -0.0604 (0.0549)
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Founded1931 -0.0743 (0.0565) -0.0855 (0.0450) -0.0625 (0.0571)
Founded1932 -0.0928 (0.0569) -0.0566 (0.0438) -0.0924 (0.0576)
Founded1933 -0.0458 (0.0568) -0.0411 (0.0443) -0.0458 (0.0572)
Founded1934 -0.1146 (0.0548) -0.0662 (0.0432) -0.1108 (0.0555)
Founded1935 -0.0289 (0.0510) -0.0210 (0.0409) -0.0339 (0.0513)
Founded1936 -0.0384 (0.0541) -0.0110 (0.0428) -0.0291 (0.0546)
Founded1937 -0.0412 (0.0510) -0.0517 (0.0431) -0.0425 (0.0516)
Founded1938 -0.0213 (0.0514) -0.0517 (0.0428) -0.0241 (0.0517)
Founded1939 -0.0590 (0.0532) -0.0549 (0.0424) -0.0740 (0.0533)
Founded1940 -0.0352 (0.0519) -0.0084 (0.0412) -0.0442 (0.0523)
Founded1941 -0.0350 (0.0492) -0.0475 (0.0404) -0.0495 (0.0497)
Founded1942 -0.1124 (0.0506) -0.0830 (0.0414) -0.1128 (0.0510)
Founded1943 -0.0912 (0.0490) -0.0479 (0.0403) -0.0870 (0.0495)
Founded1944 -0.0916 (0.0495) -0.0525 (0.0409) -0.0863 (0.0500)
Founded1945 -0.0337 (0.0471) -0.0127 (0.0401) -0.0291 (0.0477)
Constant 0.2617 (0.0992) 0.5505 (0.0457) 0.6540 (0.0840)
Observations 4,407 8,713 4,407
R-squared 0.0790 0.0706 0.0683
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Table A3: 36-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s36
ln(capital) 0.0242 (0.0053)
Corporation 0.2936 (0.0267) 0.3575 (0.0199) 0.3403 (0.0248)
Limited partnership -0.0089 (0.0197) -0.0098 (0.0143) 0.0035 (0.0195)
Share partnership 0.0872 (0.0368) 0.1417 (0.0323) 0.1297 (0.0355)
One general partner 0.0576 (0.0223) 0.0685 (0.0171) 0.0578 (0.0224)
3+ plus general partners -0.0262 (0.0200) -0.0236 (0.0135) -0.0194 (0.0200)
Family firm 0.1922 (0.0186) 0.2278 (0.0126) 0.2050 (0.0184)
2+ experienced partners -0.0462 (0.0226) -0.0016 (0.0167) -0.0321 (0.0225)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0382 (0.0303) 0.0283 (0.0249) 0.0418 (0.0303)
Prior joint firm⇥Family firm -0.0177 (0.0437) -0.0506 (0.0343) -0.0188 (0.0435)
Muslims + others 0.0031 (0.0377) -0.0042 (0.0316) 0.0041 (0.0377)
Only Muslims 0.0403 (0.0290) 0.0594 (0.0205) 0.0528 (0.0289)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0264 (0.0198) -0.0423 (0.0143) -0.0243 (0.0199)
Cairo 0.0060 (0.0143) 0.0304 (0.0102) 0.0047 (0.0143)
Mansoura 0.1191 (0.0321) 0.1366 (0.0240) 0.1091 (0.0324)
Construction 0.1533 (0.0861) 0.2366 (0.0434) 0.1678 (0.0866)
Cottton trade 0.1701 (0.0801) 0.2414 (0.0365) 0.1944 (0.0805)
Cotton manufacturing 0.1624 (0.0959) 0.2958 (0.0548) 0.1872 (0.0968)
Finance 0.2229 (0.0822) 0.2634 (0.0411) 0.2428 (0.0826)
Land 0.2074 (0.0900) 0.3172 (0.0536) 0.2275 (0.0910)
Manufacturing 0.1726 (0.0756) 0.2021 (0.0322) 0.1752 (0.0761)
Mining 0.1698 (0.1055) 0.2268 (0.0720) 0.1769 (0.1059)
Services 0.1575 (0.0760) 0.1868 (0.0323) 0.1554 (0.0765)
Transportation 0.1504 (0.0830) 0.2032 (0.0430) 0.1543 (0.0834)
Wholesale and retail 0.1599 (0.0744) 0.2072 (0.0303) 0.1601 (0.0749)
Founded1917 -0.0079 (0.0640) 0.0418 (0.0524) -0.0043 (0.0645)
Founded1918 -0.2064 (0.0622) -0.1328 (0.0509) -0.1957 (0.0627)
Founded1919 -0.0976 (0.0608) -0.0209 (0.0465) -0.0874 (0.0612)
Founded1920 -0.0719 (0.0678) -0.0510 (0.0471) -0.0649 (0.0685)
Founded1921 -0.0679 (0.0732) 0.0007 (0.0515) -0.0585 (0.0737)
Founded1922 -0.0027 (0.0663) -0.0052 (0.0486) 0.0008 (0.0666)
Founded1923 -0.1055 (0.0716) -0.0715 (0.0500) -0.1063 (0.0719)
Founded1924 -0.0834 (0.0678) -0.0780 (0.0480) -0.0758 (0.0683)
Founded1925 -0.0404 (0.0654) -0.0155 (0.0471) -0.0336 (0.0662)
Founded1926 -0.0564 (0.0675) -0.0449 (0.0483) -0.0489 (0.0679)
Founded1927 -0.1135 (0.0636) -0.0600 (0.0477) -0.1079 (0.0641)
Founded1928 -0.1112 (0.0660) 0.0096 (0.0477) -0.1040 (0.0664)
Founded1929 -0.0568 (0.0634) -0.0573 (0.0481) -0.0477 (0.0640)
Founded1930 -0.0649 (0.0635) -0.0097 (0.0487) -0.0568 (0.0639)
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Founded1931 -0.0378 (0.0643) -0.0585 (0.0502) -0.0298 (0.0648)
Founded1932 -0.0847 (0.0645) -0.0573 (0.0493) -0.0843 (0.0652)
Founded1933 -0.0392 (0.0656) -0.0275 (0.0497) -0.0391 (0.0660)
Founded1934 -0.0804 (0.0622) -0.0248 (0.0482) -0.0778 (0.0628)
Founded1935 -0.0287 (0.0604) 0.0149 (0.0464) -0.0322 (0.0607)
Founded1936 -0.0711 (0.0651) -0.0073 (0.0491) -0.0647 (0.0654)
Founded1937 0.0008 (0.0590) -0.0004 (0.0482) -0.0000 (0.0595)
Founded1938 0.0084 (0.0598) 0.0188 (0.0475) 0.0065 (0.0601)
Founded1939 -0.0112 (0.0606) 0.0184 (0.0471) -0.0214 (0.0608)
Founded1940 -0.0236 (0.0603) 0.0230 (0.0468) -0.0297 (0.0607)
Founded1941 -0.0415 (0.0577) -0.0227 (0.0455) -0.0514 (0.0582)
Founded1942 -0.0941 (0.0581) -0.0397 (0.0462) -0.0945 (0.0586)
Founded1943 -0.0852 (0.0568) -0.0273 (0.0454) -0.0823 (0.0572)
Founded1944 -0.1001 (0.0573) -0.0408 (0.0460) -0.0965 (0.0579)
Founded1945 0.0140 (0.0549) 0.0486 (0.0451) 0.0172 (0.0555)
Constant 0.2290 (0.1073) 0.3880 (0.0496) 0.4957 (0.0895)
Observations 4,407 8,713 4,407
R-squared 0.0858 0.0804 0.0817
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Table A4: 12-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s12
ln(capital) 0.0217 (0.0036)
Corporation 0.1256 (0.0179) 0.1878 (0.0134) 0.1674 (0.0170)
Limited partnership -0.0004 (0.0141) 0.0192 (0.0105) 0.0106 (0.0140)
Share partnership 0.0542 (0.0218) 0.1035 (0.0192) 0.0923 (0.0212)
One general partner 0.0256 (0.0160) 0.0274 (0.0123) 0.0258 (0.0160)
3+ plus general partners -0.0188 (0.0144) -0.0096 (0.0101) -0.0127 (0.0144)
Family firm 0.0961 (0.0119) 0.1087 (0.0086) 0.1075 (0.0119)
2+ experienced partners -0.0234 (0.0166) 0.0096 (0.0123) -0.0108 (0.0165)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0337 (0.0216) 0.0235 (0.0183) 0.0369 (0.0216)
Prior joint firm*Family firm -0.0419 (0.0281) -0.0332 (0.0220) -0.0429 (0.0279)
Muslims + others -0.0395 (0.0301) -0.0453 (0.0258) -0.0386 (0.0300)
Only Muslims -0.0022 (0.0198) 0.0320 (0.0132) 0.0090 (0.0198)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0394 (0.0153) -0.0493 (0.0115) -0.0375 (0.0154)
Cairo -0.0017 (0.0103) 0.0142 (0.0076) -0.0029 (0.0103)
Mansoura 0.0729 (0.0195) 0.0934 (0.0143) 0.0639 (0.0194)
Construction 0.0894 (0.0723) 0.1486 (0.0351) 0.1024 (0.0721)
Cottton trade 0.0643 (0.0688) 0.1352 (0.0310) 0.0861 (0.0685)
Cotton manufacturing 0.1131 (0.0706) 0.1603 (0.0390) 0.1353 (0.0702)
Finance 0.1116 (0.0679) 0.1730 (0.0312) 0.1295 (0.0676)
Land 0.0608 (0.0758) 0.1264 (0.0460) 0.0788 (0.0762)
Manufacturing 0.0821 (0.0663) 0.1072 (0.0290) 0.0844 (0.0661)
Mining 0.1079 (0.0774) 0.1605 (0.0491) 0.1143 (0.0777)
Services 0.0822 (0.0665) 0.1034 (0.0290) 0.0803 (0.0663)
Transportation 0.0691 (0.0716) 0.0878 (0.0372) 0.0727 (0.0714)
Wholesale and retail 0.0937 (0.0655) 0.1281 (0.0276) 0.0938 (0.0652)
Founded1917 -0.0053 (0.0372) 0.0107 (0.0347) -0.0020 (0.0376)
Founded1918 -0.1677 (0.0429) -0.1079 (0.0379) -0.1582 (0.0432)
Founded1919 -0.0515 (0.0368) -0.0107 (0.0310) -0.0424 (0.0370)
Founded1920 -0.0211 (0.0386) -0.0334 (0.0320) -0.0148 (0.0388)
Founded1921 -0.1179 (0.0523) -0.0372 (0.0355) -0.1095 (0.0523)
Founded1922 -0.0776 (0.0454) -0.0371 (0.0339) -0.0745 (0.0456)
Founded1923 -0.1602 (0.0534) -0.0697 (0.0353) -0.1609 (0.0532)
Founded1924 -0.0420 (0.0403) -0.0693 (0.0342) -0.0352 (0.0408)
Founded1925 -0.0406 (0.0407) -0.0351 (0.0327) -0.0346 (0.0411)
Founded1926 -0.1205 (0.0486) -0.0850 (0.0349) -0.1138 (0.0487)
Founded1927 -0.0782 (0.0399) -0.0543 (0.0330) -0.0732 (0.0403)
Founded1928 -0.0987 (0.0429) -0.0339 (0.0329) -0.0923 (0.0434)
Founded1929 -0.0759 (0.0406) -0.0725 (0.0340) -0.0678 (0.0410)
Founded1930 -0.0587 (0.0385) -0.0174 (0.0326) -0.0515 (0.0389)
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Founded1931 -0.0519 (0.0397) -0.0641 (0.0352) -0.0448 (0.0402)
Founded1932 -0.0589 (0.0406) -0.0263 (0.0334) -0.0586 (0.0408)
Founded1933 -0.0150 (0.0385) -0.0157 (0.0334) -0.0149 (0.0388)
Founded1934 -0.0495 (0.0373) -0.0510 (0.0334) -0.0472 (0.0377)
Founded1935 -0.0340 (0.0357) -0.0132 (0.0310) -0.0371 (0.0360)
Founded1936 -0.0566 (0.0401) -0.0256 (0.0334) -0.0510 (0.0404)
Founded1937 -0.0390 (0.0359) -0.0134 (0.0318) -0.0397 (0.0362)
Founded1938 -0.0455 (0.0375) -0.0491 (0.0335) -0.0472 (0.0378)
Founded1939 -0.0505 (0.0383) -0.0141 (0.0315) -0.0596 (0.0384)
Founded1940 -0.0391 (0.0368) -0.0009 (0.0311) -0.0446 (0.0370)
Founded1941 -0.0542 (0.0356) -0.0463 (0.0313) -0.0631 (0.0359)
Founded1942 -0.1071 (0.0374) -0.0798 (0.0326) -0.1073 (0.0376)
Founded1943 -0.0416 (0.0339) -0.0251 (0.0307) -0.0390 (0.0341)
Founded1944 -0.0514 (0.0349) -0.0307 (0.0313) -0.0481 (0.0352)
Founded1945 -0.0389 (0.0333) -0.0210 (0.0309) -0.0361 (0.0336)
Constant 0.5697 (0.0809) 0.7323 (0.0375) 0.8088 (0.0700)
Observations 4,407 8,713 4,407
R-squared 0.0578 0.0491 0.0512
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Table A5: 120-month survival of cohorts 1916–40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s120
ln(capital) -0.0051 (0.0070)
Corporation 0.5728 (0.0359) 0.5624 (0.0264) 0.5631 (0.0328)
Limited partnership -0.0200 (0.0250) -0.0322 (0.0167) -0.0223 (0.0249)
Share partnership 0.1242 (0.0529) 0.1077 (0.0465) 0.1156 (0.0515)
One general partner 0.0892 (0.0282) 0.0889 (0.0199) 0.0895 (0.0282)
3+ plus general partners 0.0205 (0.0267) -0.0116 (0.0160) 0.0190 (0.0266)
Family firm 0.2304 (0.0260) 0.2371 (0.0163) 0.2276 (0.0258)
2+ experienced partners -0.0835 (0.0288) -0.0519 (0.0201) -0.0858 (0.0287)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.1078 (0.0380) 0.0474 (0.0290) 0.1064 (0.0379)
Prior joint firm⇥Family firm -0.0627 (0.0640) -0.0246 (0.0459) -0.0618 (0.0640)
Muslims + others -0.0300 (0.0462) -0.0366 (0.0364) -0.0296 (0.0462)
Only Muslims 0.0941 (0.0397) 0.0949 (0.0267) 0.0915 (0.0396)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0097 (0.0241) -0.0269 (0.0156) -0.0099 (0.0241)
Cairo -0.0012 (0.0182) 0.0057 (0.0120) -0.0007 (0.0182)
Mansoura 0.1015 (0.0489) 0.0862 (0.0332) 0.1038 (0.0488)
Construction 0.0664 (0.0912) 0.2253 (0.0436) 0.0631 (0.0910)
Cottton trade 0.0892 (0.0857) 0.2460 (0.0351) 0.0833 (0.0853)
Cotton manufacturing 0.1330 (0.1093) 0.2892 (0.0669) 0.1279 (0.1090)
Finance 0.1327 (0.0903) 0.2731 (0.0424) 0.1278 (0.0898)
Land 0.1140 (0.1035) 0.3040 (0.0669) 0.1094 (0.1032)
Manufacturing 0.0951 (0.0797) 0.2266 (0.0294) 0.0937 (0.0796)
Mining 0.2062 (0.1151) 0.3333 (0.0769) 0.2047 (0.1149)
Services 0.0774 (0.0801) 0.2151 (0.0291) 0.0773 (0.0801)
Transportation 0.1472 (0.0899) 0.2460 (0.0442) 0.1455 (0.0898)
Wholesale and retail 0.0803 (0.0770) 0.2161 (0.0255) 0.0796 (0.0769)
Founded1917 -0.0249 (0.0711) 0.0130 (0.0547) -0.0257 (0.0710)
Founded1918 -0.1031 (0.0652) -0.0646 (0.0500) -0.1055 (0.0651)
Founded1919 -0.0231 (0.0662) -0.0307 (0.0468) -0.0253 (0.0661)
Founded1920 -0.0602 (0.0746) -0.0399 (0.0475) -0.0618 (0.0746)
Founded1921 -0.0671 (0.0783) -0.0373 (0.0519) -0.0693 (0.0782)
Founded1922 -0.0450 (0.0746) -0.0327 (0.0497) -0.0459 (0.0745)
Founded1923 -0.1600 (0.0743) -0.0724 (0.0495) -0.1600 (0.0744)
Founded1924 -0.0056 (0.0726) -0.0220 (0.0480) -0.0075 (0.0725)
Founded1925 -0.0191 (0.0707) -0.0363 (0.0479) -0.0206 (0.0705)
Founded1926 -0.0658 (0.0741) -0.0372 (0.0496) -0.0675 (0.0740)
Founded1927 -0.0928 (0.0676) -0.0378 (0.0479) -0.0941 (0.0676)
Founded1928 0.0063 (0.0705) 0.0562 (0.0495) 0.0046 (0.0705)
Founded1929 -0.0080 (0.0699) -0.0262 (0.0487) -0.0101 (0.0697)
Founded1930 -0.0171 (0.0704) 0.0211 (0.0504) -0.0190 (0.0703)
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Founded1931 -0.0935 (0.0706) -0.0685 (0.0507) -0.0954 (0.0705)
Founded1932 -0.0851 (0.0686) -0.0570 (0.0496) -0.0853 (0.0686)
Founded1933 0.0442 (0.0727) 0.0386 (0.0508) 0.0440 (0.0727)
Founded1934 -0.1281 (0.0663) -0.0439 (0.0491) -0.1288 (0.0663)
Founded1935 0.0018 (0.0677) 0.0257 (0.0480) 0.0024 (0.0676)
Founded1936 -0.0298 (0.0700) 0.0330 (0.0501) -0.0313 (0.0700)
Founded1937 -0.0100 (0.0662) -0.0035 (0.0497) -0.0100 (0.0661)
Founded1938 0.0557 (0.0669) 0.0732 (0.0492) 0.0559 (0.0669)
Founded1939 0.0346 (0.0676) 0.0541 (0.0488) 0.0367 (0.0676)
Founded1940 0.0123 (0.0664) 0.0701 (0.0484) 0.0136 (0.0663)
Constant 0.3465 (0.1211) 0.1247 (0.0470) 0.2904 (0.0945)
Observations 3,001 6,592 3,001
R-squared 0.1400 0.1105 0.1398
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Table A6: 60-month survival of cohorts 1920–45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s60
ln(capital) 0.0131 (0.0061)
Corporation 0.4141 (0.0313) 0.4567 (0.0232) 0.4397 (0.0289)
Limited partnership -0.0400 (0.0219) -0.0345 (0.0156) -0.0329 (0.0217)
Share partnership 0.1190 (0.0415) 0.1440 (0.0365) 0.1422 (0.0400)
One general partner 0.0989 (0.0253) 0.0909 (0.0187) 0.0994 (0.0253)
3+ plus general partners -0.0096 (0.0222) -0.0113 (0.0148) -0.0056 (0.0221)
Family firm 0.2272 (0.0217) 0.2595 (0.0144) 0.2345 (0.0214)
2+ experienced partners -0.0478 (0.0243) -0.0186 (0.0178) -0.0402 (0.0241)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0709 (0.0322) 0.0363 (0.0263) 0.0726 (0.0322)
Prior joint firm*Family firm -0.0650 (0.0503) -0.0754 (0.0387) -0.0651 (0.0502)
Muslims + others -0.0261 (0.0396) -0.0309 (0.0324) -0.0256 (0.0397)
Only Muslims 0.0604 (0.0327) 0.0815 (0.0226) 0.0668 (0.0326)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0349 (0.0216) -0.0456 (0.0153) -0.0335 (0.0216)
Cairo 0.0048 (0.0161) 0.0209 (0.0112) 0.0046 (0.0162)
Mansoura 0.1311 (0.0355) 0.1132 (0.0262) 0.1259 (0.0354)
Construction 0.1919 (0.1138) 0.2769 (0.0455) 0.1977 (0.1142)
Cottton trade 0.2451 (0.1101) 0.3219 (0.0384) 0.2557 (0.1104)
Cotton manufacturing 0.1620 (0.1277) 0.2892 (0.0645) 0.1731 (0.1278)
Finance 0.2634 (0.1118) 0.3283 (0.0437) 0.2725 (0.1122)
Land 0.3147 (0.1189) 0.4039 (0.0598) 0.3232 (0.1192)
Manufacturing 0.2318 (0.1048) 0.2687 (0.0326) 0.2310 (0.1052)
Mining 0.2876 (0.1289) 0.3055 (0.0726) 0.2899 (0.1293)
Services 0.1974 (0.1053) 0.2460 (0.0328) 0.1938 (0.1058)
Transportation 0.2396 (0.1109) 0.2865 (0.0444) 0.2395 (0.1113)
Wholesale and retail 0.2226 (0.1040) 0.2777 (0.0305) 0.2203 (0.1044)
Founded1921 -0.0109 (0.0769) 0.0377 (0.0435) -0.0095 (0.0771)
Founded1922 0.1317 (0.0697) 0.0489 (0.0395) 0.1299 (0.0699)
Founded1923 -0.0538 (0.0740) -0.0078 (0.0407) -0.0578 (0.0739)
Founded1924 0.0473 (0.0703) 0.0219 (0.0380) 0.0478 (0.0705)
Founded1925 -0.0265 (0.0677) -0.0014 (0.0374) -0.0263 (0.0679)
Founded1926 -0.0030 (0.0704) -0.0102 (0.0393) -0.0025 (0.0705)
Founded1927 0.0078 (0.0655) 0.0130 (0.0380) 0.0073 (0.0657)
Founded1928 0.0327 (0.0673) 0.0868 (0.0386) 0.0330 (0.0674)
Founded1929 0.0671 (0.0657) 0.0314 (0.0386) 0.0683 (0.0659)
Founded1930 0.0756 (0.0658) 0.0678 (0.0397) 0.0762 (0.0659)
Founded1931 0.0479 (0.0673) 0.0177 (0.0414) 0.0486 (0.0676)
Founded1932 0.0353 (0.0662) -0.0054 (0.0398) 0.0319 (0.0663)
Founded1933 0.0907 (0.0689) 0.0522 (0.0412) 0.0871 (0.0690)
Founded1934 0.0022 (0.0634) 0.0314 (0.0389) -0.0001 (0.0636)
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Founded1935 0.0947 (0.0631) 0.0849 (0.0371) 0.0892 (0.0631)
Founded1936 0.0286 (0.0665) 0.0636 (0.0400) 0.0284 (0.0665)
Founded1937 0.1004 (0.0616) 0.0599 (0.0393) 0.0964 (0.0617)
Founded1938 0.1261 (0.0618) 0.1044 (0.0383) 0.1214 (0.0618)
Founded1939 0.0927 (0.0633) 0.0834 (0.0378) 0.0836 (0.0632)
Founded1940 0.0817 (0.0624) 0.0919 (0.0372) 0.0748 (0.0624)
Founded1941 0.0766 (0.0594) 0.0515 (0.0351) 0.0676 (0.0594)
Founded1942 0.0508 (0.0595) 0.0587 (0.0361) 0.0470 (0.0596)
Founded1943 0.0665 (0.0580) 0.0803 (0.0348) 0.0645 (0.0581)
Founded1944 0.0750 (0.0584) 0.0789 (0.0356) 0.0734 (0.0586)
Founded1945 0.2261 (0.0559) 0.2059 (0.0344) 0.2242 (0.0561)
Constant 0.0583 (0.1336) 0.1431 (0.0389) 0.2074 (0.1144)
Observations 3,856 7,793 3,856
R-squared 0.1118 0.1025 0.1108
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Table A7: 24-month survival of cohorts 1920–45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
ln(capital) 0.0374 (0.0049)
Corporation 0.2141 (0.0252) 0.3070 (0.0177) 0.2874 (0.0234)
Limited partnership -0.0047 (0.0192) -0.0063 (0.0141) 0.0156 (0.0191)
Share partnership 0.0805 (0.0314) 0.1468 (0.0270) 0.1469 (0.0302)
One general partner 0.0515 (0.0215) 0.0789 (0.0166) 0.0528 (0.0216)
3+ plus general partners -0.0252 (0.0193) -0.0119 (0.0132) -0.0137 (0.0193)
Family firm 0.1415 (0.0174) 0.1935 (0.0118) 0.1622 (0.0173)
2+ experienced partners -0.0348 (0.0216) 0.0044 (0.0160) -0.0131 (0.0215)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0497 (0.0280) 0.0350 (0.0235) 0.0546 (0.0280)
Prior joint firm⇥Family firm -0.0491 (0.0389) -0.0570 (0.0308) -0.0494 (0.0387)
Muslims + others -0.0601 (0.0371) -0.0605 (0.0316) -0.0586 (0.0370)
Only Muslims -0.0053 (0.0273) 0.0303 (0.0191) 0.0131 (0.0272)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0563 (0.0199) -0.0446 (0.0144) -0.0521 (0.0200)
Cairo -0.0081 (0.0137) 0.0154 (0.0099) -0.0085 (0.0138)
Mansoura 0.0722 (0.0303) 0.1182 (0.0212) 0.0575 (0.0306)
Construction 0.2216 (0.1199) 0.2475 (0.0453) 0.2384 (0.1215)
Cottton trade 0.1978 (0.1167) 0.2492 (0.0400) 0.2281 (0.1182)
Cotton manufacturing 0.1549 (0.1270) 0.2597 (0.0545) 0.1868 (0.1290)
Finance 0.2386 (0.1169) 0.2709 (0.0423) 0.2648 (0.1183)
Land 0.2399 (0.1187) 0.2907 (0.0502) 0.2641 (0.1207)
Manufacturing 0.2323 (0.1134) 0.2191 (0.0364) 0.2299 (0.1149)
Mining 0.2424 (0.1310) 0.2176 (0.0710) 0.2492 (0.1320)
Services 0.2423 (0.1138) 0.2080 (0.0366) 0.2320 (0.1153)
Transportation 0.2028 (0.1181) 0.1971 (0.0456) 0.2026 (0.1195)
Wholesale and retail 0.2382 (0.1129) 0.2294 (0.0349) 0.2317 (0.1144)
Founded1921 -0.0431 (0.0637) 0.0524 (0.0384) -0.0391 (0.0643)
Founded1922 0.0326 (0.0557) 0.0157 (0.0360) 0.0274 (0.0562)
Founded1923 -0.0379 (0.0620) -0.0146 (0.0371) -0.0494 (0.0618)
Founded1924 0.0041 (0.0562) -0.0002 (0.0352) 0.0056 (0.0568)
Founded1925 0.0099 (0.0553) 0.0321 (0.0339) 0.0106 (0.0563)
Founded1926 -0.0426 (0.0596) 0.0142 (0.0354) -0.0411 (0.0597)
Founded1927 -0.0524 (0.0542) -0.0077 (0.0345) -0.0538 (0.0551)
Founded1928 -0.0202 (0.0550) 0.0690 (0.0339) -0.0192 (0.0556)
Founded1929 -0.0309 (0.0543) -0.0271 (0.0355) -0.0273 (0.0552)
Founded1930 -0.0074 (0.0529) 0.0459 (0.0349) -0.0056 (0.0534)
Founded1931 -0.0086 (0.0549) -0.0002 (0.0372) -0.0067 (0.0556)
Founded1932 -0.0261 (0.0558) 0.0289 (0.0357) -0.0358 (0.0565)
Founded1933 0.0206 (0.0559) 0.0446 (0.0365) 0.0104 (0.0562)
Founded1934 -0.0479 (0.0532) 0.0183 (0.0350) -0.0544 (0.0540)
Founded1935 0.0400 (0.0498) 0.0648 (0.0324) 0.0241 (0.0502)
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Founded1936 0.0278 (0.0528) 0.0746 (0.0347) 0.0274 (0.0532)
Founded1937 0.0259 (0.0492) 0.0332 (0.0349) 0.0143 (0.0498)
Founded1938 0.0463 (0.0497) 0.0338 (0.0345) 0.0330 (0.0501)
Founded1939 0.0085 (0.0520) 0.0304 (0.0341) -0.0174 (0.0521)
Founded1940 0.0328 (0.0510) 0.0773 (0.0328) 0.0131 (0.0513)
Founded1941 0.0330 (0.0480) 0.0388 (0.0317) 0.0074 (0.0485)
Founded1942 -0.0452 (0.0494) 0.0024 (0.0330) -0.0559 (0.0498)
Founded1943 -0.0237 (0.0478) 0.0379 (0.0316) -0.0294 (0.0482)
Founded1944 -0.0252 (0.0482) 0.0320 (0.0322) -0.0299 (0.0487)
Founded1945 0.0333 (0.0454) 0.0723 (0.0311) 0.0278 (0.0460)
Constant 0.0679 (0.1320) 0.4190 (0.0416) 0.4945 (0.1210)
Observations 3,856 7,793 3,856
R-squared 0.0783 0.0725 0.0659
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Table A8: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
assuming firms with survival information survived for 60 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
ln(capital) -0.0111 (0.0051)
Corporation 0.3853 (0.0274) 0.3779 (0.0207) 0.3628 (0.0253)
Limited partnership -0.0389 (0.0188) -0.0452 (0.0137) -0.0447 (0.0186)
Share partnership 0.1083 (0.0364) 0.0844 (0.0326) 0.0878 (0.0351)
One general partner 0.0825 (0.0215) 0.0873 (0.0162) 0.0829 (0.0215)
3+ plus general partners 0.0037 (0.0190) -0.0106 (0.0129) 0.0004 (0.0189)
Family firm 0.1742 (0.0187) 0.1938 (0.0125) 0.1680 (0.0184)
2+ experienced partners -0.0746 (0.0226) -0.0570 (0.0166) -0.0820 (0.0223)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0594 (0.0305) 0.0281 (0.0248) 0.0584 (0.0305)
Prior joint firm*Family firm -0.0290 (0.0470) -0.0448 (0.0365) -0.0287 (0.0471)
Muslims + others 0.0372 (0.0341) 0.0296 (0.0283) 0.0365 (0.0340)
Only Muslims 0.1289 (0.0243) 0.1262 (0.0171) 0.1251 (0.0243)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0218 (0.0187) -0.0308 (0.0133) -0.0226 (0.0187)
Cairo 0.0295 (0.0137) 0.0410 (0.0096) 0.0300 (0.0137)
Mansoura 0.1110 (0.0311) 0.0999 (0.0235) 0.1150 (0.0310)
Construction 0.1193 (0.0767) 0.2422 (0.0403) 0.1121 (0.0764)
Cottton trade 0.1248 (0.0728) 0.2358 (0.0350) 0.1143 (0.0727)
Cotton manufacturing 0.0825 (0.0948) 0.2425 (0.0592) 0.0725 (0.0950)
Finance 0.1831 (0.0749) 0.2734 (0.0399) 0.1747 (0.0747)
Land 0.2155 (0.0831) 0.3672 (0.0504) 0.2076 (0.0830)
Manufacturing 0.1032 (0.0671) 0.2084 (0.0304) 0.1022 (0.0670)
Mining 0.2039 (0.0903) 0.3214 (0.0606) 0.2009 (0.0902)
Services 0.0782 (0.0675) 0.1994 (0.0304) 0.0795 (0.0674)
Transportation 0.1122 (0.0747) 0.2201 (0.0408) 0.1097 (0.0746)
Wholesale and retail 0.0867 (0.0659) 0.2138 (0.0285) 0.0868 (0.0659)
Founded1921 -0.0300 (0.0535) 0.0215 (0.0326) -0.0308 (0.0535)
Founded1922 0.1198 (0.0420) 0.0591 (0.0277) 0.1223 (0.0420)
Founded1923 -0.0204 (0.0482) -0.0005 (0.0299) -0.0167 (0.0483)
Founded1924 -0.0205 (0.0491) -0.0369 (0.0291) -0.0215 (0.0491)
Founded1925 -0.0613 (0.0443) -0.0420 (0.0278) -0.0610 (0.0443)
Founded1926 -0.0692 (0.0501) -0.0439 (0.0298) -0.0695 (0.0502)
Founded1927 -0.0292 (0.0419) -0.0284 (0.0283) -0.0288 (0.0419)
Founded1928 -0.0195 (0.0449) 0.0269 (0.0292) -0.0192 (0.0450)
Founded1929 0.0042 (0.0433) -0.0067 (0.0290) 0.0036 (0.0433)
Founded1930 0.0489 (0.0410) 0.0551 (0.0290) 0.0479 (0.0410)
Founded1931 -0.0033 (0.0456) 0.0207 (0.0310) -0.0037 (0.0455)
Founded1932 -0.0370 (0.0436) -0.0418 (0.0304) -0.0334 (0.0437)
Founded1933 0.0271 (0.0461) 0.0111 (0.0312) 0.0304 (0.0462)
Founded1934 -0.0387 (0.0410) -0.0097 (0.0297) -0.0360 (0.0409)
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Founded1935 0.0199 (0.0382) 0.0213 (0.0274) 0.0247 (0.0382)
Founded1936 -0.0082 (0.0431) 0.0146 (0.0305) -0.0076 (0.0431)
Founded1937 0.0342 (0.0368) 0.0210 (0.0295) 0.0376 (0.0368)
Founded1938 0.0410 (0.0380) 0.0306 (0.0294) 0.0449 (0.0381)
Founded1939 0.0028 (0.0394) 0.0191 (0.0285) 0.0101 (0.0393)
Founded1940 0.0062 (0.0382) 0.0406 (0.0275) 0.0121 (0.0381)
Founded1941 -0.0342 (0.0341) -0.0288 (0.0255) -0.0271 (0.0340)
Founded1942 -0.0396 (0.0345) -0.0103 (0.0264) -0.0365 (0.0346)
Founded1943 -0.0042 (0.0313) 0.0263 (0.0243) -0.0026 (0.0314)
Founded1944 0.0236 (0.0315) 0.0443 (0.0247) 0.0247 (0.0315)
Founded1945 0.1616 (0.0267) 0.1736 (0.0217) 0.1631 (0.0267)
Constant 0.5930 (0.0885) 0.3242 (0.0305) 0.4688 (0.0672)
Observations 5,181 10,276 5,181
R-squared 0.0767 0.0715 0.0759
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Table A9: 24-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
assuming firms with no survival information survived for 24 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
ln(capital) 0.0162 (0.0039)
Corporation 0.2061 (0.0209) 0.2548 (0.0149) 0.2391 (0.0194)
Limited partnership -0.0054 (0.0160) -0.0142 (0.0120) 0.0030 (0.0159)
Share partnership 0.0703 (0.0274) 0.0983 (0.0241) 0.1003 (0.0264)
One general partner 0.0407 (0.0179) 0.0656 (0.0139) 0.0401 (0.0179)
3+ plus general partners -0.0204 (0.0162) -0.0172 (0.0112) -0.0157 (0.0161)
Family firm 0.1233 (0.0145) 0.1546 (0.0099) 0.1322 (0.0144)
2+ experienced partners -0.0558 (0.0197) -0.0274 (0.0146) -0.0450 (0.0196)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0424 (0.0262) 0.0276 (0.0218) 0.0438 (0.0262)
Prior joint firm⇥Family firm -0.0238 (0.0359) -0.0293 (0.0285) -0.0241 (0.0358)
Muslims + others -0.0095 (0.0298) -0.0134 (0.0257) -0.0083 (0.0298)
Only Muslims 0.0420 (0.0198) 0.0600 (0.0138) 0.0476 (0.0197)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0304 (0.0166) -0.0293 (0.0120) -0.0293 (0.0166)
Cairo 0.0096 (0.0114) 0.0251 (0.0082) 0.0088 (0.0114)
Mansoura 0.0602 (0.0258) 0.1020 (0.0183) 0.0543 (0.0259)
Construction 0.1061 (0.0700) 0.2073 (0.0368) 0.1167 (0.0698)
Cottton trade 0.0654 (0.0672) 0.1936 (0.0330) 0.0809 (0.0669)
Cotton manufacturing 0.0523 (0.0822) 0.2168 (0.0470) 0.0669 (0.0822)
Finance 0.1339 (0.0671) 0.2218 (0.0354) 0.1461 (0.0668)
Land 0.1282 (0.0713) 0.2584 (0.0409) 0.1398 (0.0714)
Manufacturing 0.0903 (0.0631) 0.1668 (0.0300) 0.0918 (0.0629)
Mining 0.1267 (0.0812) 0.2172 (0.0553) 0.1311 (0.0810)
Services 0.1010 (0.0633) 0.1699 (0.0299) 0.0991 (0.0631)
Transportation 0.0695 (0.0693) 0.1554 (0.0384) 0.0732 (0.0691)
Wholesale and retail 0.0901 (0.0622) 0.1769 (0.0285) 0.0901 (0.0620)
Founded1921 -0.0007 (0.0437) 0.0272 (0.0269) 0.0005 (0.0437)
Founded1922 0.0801 (0.0327) 0.0138 (0.0236) 0.0765 (0.0327)
Founded1923 0.0226 (0.0387) -0.0188 (0.0256) 0.0172 (0.0384)
Founded1924 0.0185 (0.0391) -0.0435 (0.0260) 0.0200 (0.0392)
Founded1925 0.0353 (0.0354) -0.0057 (0.0238) 0.0350 (0.0357)
Founded1926 -0.0255 (0.0428) -0.0186 (0.0252) -0.0251 (0.0426)
Founded1927 -0.0168 (0.0356) -0.0389 (0.0247) -0.0175 (0.0358)
Founded1928 0.0065 (0.0370) 0.0233 (0.0243) 0.0061 (0.0370)
Founded1929 -0.0074 (0.0368) -0.0519 (0.0257) -0.0066 (0.0370)
Founded1930 0.0347 (0.0327) 0.0300 (0.0238) 0.0361 (0.0327)
Founded1931 0.0171 (0.0369) -0.0051 (0.0261) 0.0177 (0.0370)
Founded1932 -0.0119 (0.0384) -0.0063 (0.0257) -0.0172 (0.0385)
Founded1933 0.0375 (0.0371) 0.0096 (0.0262) 0.0326 (0.0370)
Founded1934 -0.0146 (0.0351) -0.0133 (0.0254) -0.0185 (0.0353)
71
Table A9: 24-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
assuming firms with no survival information survived for 24 months
Founded1935 0.0465 (0.0296) 0.0169 (0.0224) 0.0395 (0.0295)
Founded1936 0.0533 (0.0326) 0.0321 (0.0246) 0.0524 (0.0326)
Founded1937 0.0394 (0.0294) 0.0027 (0.0248) 0.0346 (0.0295)
Founded1938 0.0489 (0.0309) -0.0156 (0.0257) 0.0432 (0.0309)
Founded1939 0.0084 (0.0331) -0.0143 (0.0247) -0.0024 (0.0330)
Founded1940 0.0391 (0.0311) 0.0363 (0.0224) 0.0305 (0.0311)
Founded1941 0.0177 (0.0283) -0.0181 (0.0220) 0.0074 (0.0284)
Founded1942 -0.0401 (0.0304) -0.0431 (0.0234) -0.0447 (0.0304)
Founded1943 -0.0064 (0.0271) 0.0005 (0.0210) -0.0088 (0.0271)
Founded1944 0.0045 (0.0271) 0.0075 (0.0212) 0.0030 (0.0272)
Founded1945 0.0609 (0.0230) 0.0571 (0.0189) 0.0587 (0.0231)
Constant 0.4704 (0.0769) 0.5537 (0.0299) 0.6524 (0.0630)
Observations 5,181 10,276 5,181
R-squared 0.0489 0.0519 0.0463
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Table A10: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
assuming firms with no survival information dissolve within 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
ln(capital) 0.0391 (0.0053)
Corporation 0.4088 (0.0297) 0.5087 (0.0227) 0.4883 (0.0275)
Limited partnership -0.0321 (0.0189) -0.0108 (0.0137) -0.0117 (0.0188)
Share partnership 0.1102 (0.0395) 0.1924 (0.0352) 0.1826 (0.0382)
One general partner 0.0712 (0.0217) 0.0602 (0.0163) 0.0699 (0.0218)
3+ plus general partners -0.0238 (0.0195) -0.0064 (0.0131) -0.0123 (0.0195)
Family firm 0.2289 (0.0197) 0.2673 (0.0133) 0.2505 (0.0196)
2+ experienced partners -0.0216 (0.0229) 0.0230 (0.0167) 0.0044 (0.0227)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0813 (0.0309) 0.0419 (0.0250) 0.0846 (0.0310)
Prior joint firm*Family firm -0.0757 (0.0493) -0.0792 (0.0377) -0.0764 (0.0492)
Muslims + others -0.0540 (0.0349) -0.0513 (0.0284) -0.0512 (0.0350)
Only Muslims -0.0515 (0.0275) -0.0379 (0.0196) -0.0381 (0.0278)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0402 (0.0185) -0.0520 (0.0130) -0.0375 (0.0186)
Cairo -0.0100 (0.0140) 0.0136 (0.0098) -0.0119 (0.0141)
Mansoura 0.1143 (0.0348) 0.1042 (0.0253) 0.1002 (0.0349)
Construction 0.0666 (0.0685) 0.1348 (0.0392) 0.0923 (0.0694)
Cottton trade 0.1442 (0.0646) 0.1988 (0.0335) 0.1814 (0.0655)
Cotton manufacturing 0.0447 (0.0898) 0.1806 (0.0603) 0.0800 (0.0903)
Finance 0.1420 (0.0683) 0.2204 (0.0394) 0.1715 (0.0692)
Land 0.1702 (0.0828) 0.1847 (0.0618) 0.1979 (0.0840)
Manufacturing 0.1523 (0.0576) 0.1570 (0.0279) 0.1560 (0.0586)
Mining 0.0781 (0.0885) 0.0798 (0.0594) 0.0887 (0.0896)
Services 0.1182 (0.0578) 0.1239 (0.0278) 0.1137 (0.0589)
Transportation 0.1416 (0.0679) 0.1634 (0.0395) 0.1503 (0.0686)
Wholesale and retail 0.1462 (0.0561) 0.1630 (0.0259) 0.1461 (0.0571)
Founded1921 -0.0483 (0.0537) 0.0078 (0.0329) -0.0455 (0.0540)
Founded1922 0.0383 (0.0456) -0.0139 (0.0281) 0.0297 (0.0462)
Founded1923 -0.1041 (0.0467) -0.0430 (0.0293) -0.1170 (0.0464)
Founded1924 0.0662 (0.0493) 0.0466 (0.0287) 0.0698 (0.0496)
Founded1925 -0.0403 (0.0439) 0.0043 (0.0274) -0.0412 (0.0444)
Founded1926 0.0086 (0.0488) -0.0100 (0.0293) 0.0095 (0.0490)
Founded1927 0.0049 (0.0419) 0.0214 (0.0282) 0.0033 (0.0423)
Founded1928 0.0312 (0.0456) 0.0973 (0.0301) 0.0301 (0.0457)
Founded1929 0.0673 (0.0438) 0.0330 (0.0290) 0.0693 (0.0447)
Founded1930 0.0426 (0.0429) 0.0362 (0.0296) 0.0462 (0.0429)
Founded1931 0.0460 (0.0453) -0.0095 (0.0306) 0.0475 (0.0462)
Founded1932 0.0468 (0.0448) -0.0037 (0.0305) 0.0338 (0.0454)
Founded1933 0.0877 (0.0477) 0.0454 (0.0318) 0.0760 (0.0479)
Founded1934 -0.0013 (0.0390) 0.0391 (0.0296) -0.0107 (0.0397)
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Table A10: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
assuming firms with no survival information dissolve within 12 months
Founded1935 0.1027 (0.0398) 0.1025 (0.0280) 0.0857 (0.0398)
Founded1936 0.0116 (0.0433) 0.0647 (0.0310) 0.0094 (0.0434)
Founded1937 0.0977 (0.0382) 0.0637 (0.0300) 0.0860 (0.0384)
Founded1938 0.1456 (0.0393) 0.1355 (0.0297) 0.1320 (0.0390)
Founded1939 0.1184 (0.0409) 0.1078 (0.0291) 0.0925 (0.0406)
Founded1940 0.1009 (0.0383) 0.1018 (0.0279) 0.0801 (0.0384)
Founded1941 0.1223 (0.0350) 0.0877 (0.0259) 0.0974 (0.0351)
Founded1942 0.0844 (0.0347) 0.0842 (0.0266) 0.0733 (0.0348)
Founded1943 0.0733 (0.0318) 0.0869 (0.0247) 0.0676 (0.0319)
Founded1944 0.0533 (0.0320) 0.0588 (0.0251) 0.0495 (0.0321)
Founded1945 0.1595 (0.0292) 0.1174 (0.0240) 0.1542 (0.0295)
Constant -0.2197 (0.0820) 0.1826 (0.0281) 0.2190 (0.0588)
Observations 5,181 10,276 5,181
R-squared 0.1219 0.0981 0.1126
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Table A11: 24-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
assuming firms with no survival information dissolved within 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s24_1
ln(capital) 0.0664 (0.0048)
Corporation 0.2296 (0.0263) 0.3856 (0.0193) 0.3646 (0.0242)
Limited partnership 0.0013 (0.0181) 0.0201 (0.0133) 0.0360 (0.0182)
Share partnership 0.0722 (0.0349) 0.2064 (0.0308) 0.1951 (0.0340)
One general partner 0.0293 (0.0205) 0.0384 (0.0159) 0.0271 (0.0209)
3+ plus general partners -0.0479 (0.0186) -0.0131 (0.0127) -0.0284 (0.0187)
Family firm 0.1780 (0.0175) 0.2281 (0.0120) 0.2147 (0.0175)
2+ experienced partners -0.0027 (0.0216) 0.0527 (0.0159) 0.0413 (0.0215)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0643 (0.0285) 0.0415 (0.0237) 0.0701 (0.0287)
Prior joint firm*Family firm -0.0706 (0.0414) -0.0637 (0.0323) -0.0718 (0.0412)
Muslims + others -0.1007 (0.0359) -0.0943 (0.0297) -0.0960 (0.0357)
Only Muslims -0.1383 (0.0269) -0.1042 (0.0195) -0.1156 (0.0275)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0488 (0.0184) -0.0505 (0.0132) -0.0442 (0.0186)
Cairo -0.0299 (0.0132) -0.0024 (0.0096) -0.0331 (0.0135)
Mansoura 0.0634 (0.0331) 0.1062 (0.0235) 0.0395 (0.0336)
Construction 0.0533 (0.0762) 0.0999 (0.0411) 0.0970 (0.0765)
Cottton trade 0.0848 (0.0708) 0.1567 (0.0351) 0.1479 (0.0712)
Cotton manufacturing 0.0144 (0.0883) 0.1548 (0.0555) 0.0744 (0.0913)
Finance 0.0928 (0.0737) 0.1688 (0.0391) 0.1428 (0.0740)
Land 0.0829 (0.0809) 0.0760 (0.0598) 0.1300 (0.0829)
Manufacturing 0.1393 (0.0661) 0.1154 (0.0309) 0.1456 (0.0662)
Mining 0.0009 (0.0948) -0.0244 (0.0631) 0.0189 (0.0952)
Services 0.1410 (0.0663) 0.0944 (0.0309) 0.1333 (0.0665)
Transportation 0.0989 (0.0744) 0.0987 (0.0411) 0.1139 (0.0743)
Wholesale and retail 0.1495 (0.0649) 0.1261 (0.0291) 0.1494 (0.0650)
Founded1921 -0.0190 (0.0525) 0.0135 (0.0324) -0.0143 (0.0532)
Founded1922 -0.0014 (0.0448) -0.0592 (0.0290) -0.0161 (0.0459)
Founded1923 -0.0612 (0.0488) -0.0613 (0.0299) -0.0830 (0.0487)
Founded1924 0.1053 (0.0440) 0.0400 (0.0286) 0.1114 (0.0446)
Founded1925 0.0563 (0.0425) 0.0407 (0.0272) 0.0548 (0.0440)
Founded1926 0.0524 (0.0475) 0.0153 (0.0290) 0.0539 (0.0478)
Founded1927 0.0173 (0.0398) 0.0109 (0.0276) 0.0146 (0.0411)
Founded1928 0.0572 (0.0421) 0.0938 (0.0280) 0.0554 (0.0432)
Founded1929 0.0557 (0.0408) -0.0121 (0.0287) 0.0591 (0.0427)
Founded1930 0.0284 (0.0406) 0.0110 (0.0292) 0.0345 (0.0409)
Founded1931 0.0664 (0.0425) -0.0354 (0.0308) 0.0689 (0.0438)
Founded1932 0.0719 (0.0427) 0.0317 (0.0303) 0.0500 (0.0444)
Founded1933 0.0980 (0.0441) 0.0438 (0.0307) 0.0781 (0.0447)
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Table A11: 24-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
assuming firms with no survival information dissolved within 12 months
Founded1934 0.0227 (0.0382) 0.0355 (0.0288) 0.0068 (0.0395)
Founded1935 0.1293 (0.0356) 0.0981 (0.0259) 0.1004 (0.0361)
Founded1936 0.0731 (0.0413) 0.0823 (0.0294) 0.0693 (0.0420)
Founded1937 0.1029 (0.0356) 0.0454 (0.0288) 0.0830 (0.0362)
Founded1938 0.1535 (0.0359) 0.0893 (0.0280) 0.1304 (0.0359)
Founded1939 0.1240 (0.0384) 0.0744 (0.0279) 0.0800 (0.0382)
Founded1940 0.1339 (0.0363) 0.0975 (0.0267) 0.0985 (0.0367)
Founded1941 0.1742 (0.0321) 0.0985 (0.0246) 0.1318 (0.0325)
Founded1942 0.0839 (0.0329) 0.0514 (0.0258) 0.0650 (0.0334)
Founded1943 0.0710 (0.0307) 0.0610 (0.0242) 0.0615 (0.0310)
Founded1944 0.0342 (0.0314) 0.0221 (0.0249) 0.0278 (0.0317)
Founded1945 0.0587 (0.0282) 0.0010 (0.0238) 0.0497 (0.0287)
Constant -0.3423 (0.0858) 0.4121 (0.0310) 0.4026 (0.0663)
Observations 5,181 10,276 5,181
R-squared 0.1174 0.0793 0.0874
76
Table A12: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Only general and limited partnerships
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
ln(capital) 0.0142 (0.0063)
Limited partnership -0.0472 (0.0209) -0.0387 (0.0149) -0.0398 (0.0207)
One general partner 0.0937 (0.0246) 0.0916 (0.0182) 0.0936 (0.0246)
3+ plus general partners -0.0053 (0.0215) -0.0085 (0.0142) -0.0012 (0.0215)
Family firm 0.2201 (0.0215) 0.2567 (0.0140) 0.2278 (0.0212)
2+ experienced partners -0.0594 (0.0264) -0.0215 (0.0184) -0.0507 (0.0261)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0734 (0.0431) 0.0278 (0.0311) 0.0739 (0.0432)
Prior joint firm*Family firm -0.0488 (0.0593) -0.0651 (0.0426) -0.0475 (0.0593)
Muslims + others -0.0334 (0.0526) -0.0256 (0.0387) -0.0327 (0.0527)
Only Muslims 0.0847 (0.0325) 0.0853 (0.0223) 0.0922 (0.0324)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0476 (0.0219) -0.0551 (0.0150) -0.0463 (0.0219)
Cairo 0.0074 (0.0166) 0.0303 (0.0111) 0.0065 (0.0166)
Mansoura 0.1303 (0.0370) 0.1142 (0.0266) 0.1239 (0.0369)
Construction 0.1173 (0.0891) 0.2120 (0.0457) 0.1257 (0.0895)
Cottton trade 0.2117 (0.0811) 0.2650 (0.0370) 0.2265 (0.0813)
Cotton manufacturing 0.1011 (0.1266) 0.2539 (0.0728) 0.1169 (0.1261)
Finance 0.2433 (0.0912) 0.2850 (0.0462) 0.2524 (0.0916)
Land 0.3297 (0.1622) 0.4089 (0.0973) 0.3430 (0.1630)
Manufacturing 0.1850 (0.0733) 0.2138 (0.0312) 0.1869 (0.0737)
Mining 0.1333 (0.1584) 0.1759 (0.0977) 0.1394 (0.1589)
Services 0.1382 (0.0735) 0.1812 (0.0310) 0.1368 (0.0739)
Transportation 0.1783 (0.0881) 0.2185 (0.0473) 0.1796 (0.0884)
Wholesale and retail 0.1653 (0.0715) 0.2156 (0.0287) 0.1654 (0.0720)
Founded1921 -0.0376 (0.0636) 0.0251 (0.0376) -0.0362 (0.0637)
Founded1922 0.0922 (0.0621) 0.0254 (0.0343) 0.0892 (0.0622)
Founded1923 -0.0772 (0.0621) -0.0207 (0.0347) -0.0826 (0.0616)
Founded1924 0.0283 (0.0567) 0.0059 (0.0316) 0.0282 (0.0568)
Founded1925 -0.0864 (0.0541) -0.0287 (0.0312) -0.0863 (0.0543)
Founded1926 -0.0220 (0.0633) -0.0158 (0.0342) -0.0192 (0.0633)
Founded1927 -0.0038 (0.0518) 0.0036 (0.0323) -0.0040 (0.0519)
Founded1928 0.0173 (0.0536) 0.0791 (0.0327) 0.0174 (0.0535)
Founded1929 0.0344 (0.0520) 0.0125 (0.0331) 0.0355 (0.0523)
Founded1930 0.0652 (0.0528) 0.0584 (0.0349) 0.0652 (0.0529)
Founded1931 0.0068 (0.0549) -0.0042 (0.0369) 0.0089 (0.0553)
Founded1932 -0.0128 (0.0520) -0.0333 (0.0345) -0.0177 (0.0520)
Founded1933 0.0589 (0.0548) 0.0321 (0.0358) 0.0553 (0.0548)
Founded1934 -0.0529 (0.0513) 0.0056 (0.0347) -0.0565 (0.0515)
Founded1935 0.0783 (0.0457) 0.0742 (0.0306) 0.0711 (0.0455)
Founded1936 -0.0153 (0.0546) 0.0426 (0.0353) -0.0160 (0.0545)
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Table A12: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Only general and limited partnerships
Founded1937 0.0539 (0.0471) 0.0354 (0.0353) 0.0488 (0.0472)
Founded1938 0.0967 (0.0470) 0.0860 (0.0335) 0.0902 (0.0467)
Founded1939 0.0493 (0.0475) 0.0600 (0.0323) 0.0388 (0.0471)
Founded1940 0.0374 (0.0445) 0.0698 (0.0311) 0.0297 (0.0444)
Founded1941 0.0414 (0.0380) 0.0307 (0.0277) 0.0312 (0.0379)
Founded1942 0.0018 (0.0391) 0.0320 (0.0292) -0.0030 (0.0390)
Founded1943 0.0275 (0.0362) 0.0593 (0.0273) 0.0245 (0.0361)
Founded1944 0.0316 (0.0374) 0.0548 (0.0287) 0.0292 (0.0374)
Founded1945 0.2096 (0.0338) 0.1963 (0.0279) 0.2064 (0.0339)
Constant 0.1408 (0.1011) 0.2202 (0.0311) 0.3014 (0.0733)
Observations 3,917 8,198 3,917
R-squared 0.0686 0.0757 0.0674
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Table A13: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Only general partnerships
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s60
ln(capital) 0.0072 (0.0088)
One general partner 0.3092 (0.0892) 0.4657 (0.0535) 0.3128 (0.0892)
3+ plus general partners -0.0016 (0.0259) -0.0112 (0.0161) 0.0003 (0.0258)
Family firm 0.2687 (0.0273) 0.2905 (0.0166) 0.2726 (0.0269)
2+ experienced partners -0.0375 (0.0364) 0.0085 (0.0230) -0.0324 (0.0359)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0846 (0.0564) 0.0199 (0.0383) 0.0853 (0.0564)
Prior joint firm⇥Family firm -0.0825 (0.0733) -0.0996 (0.0510) -0.0834 (0.0732)
Muslims + others -0.0376 (0.0641) 0.0113 (0.0460) -0.0374 (0.0642)
Only Muslims 0.0993 (0.0456) 0.0890 (0.0282) 0.1029 (0.0454)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0489 (0.0286) -0.0632 (0.0180) -0.0486 (0.0285)
Cairo 0.0132 (0.0242) 0.0272 (0.0146) 0.0133 (0.0242)
Mansoura 0.1216 (0.0481) 0.1045 (0.0326) 0.1205 (0.0481)
Construction 0.0310 (0.1413) 0.2258 (0.0557) 0.0331 (0.1410)
Cottton trade 0.3056 (0.1394) 0.3243 (0.0494) 0.3114 (0.1390)
Cotton manufacturing 0.1635 (0.2197) 0.3547 (0.0951) 0.1691 (0.2193)
Finance 0.0518 (0.1571) 0.2840 (0.0600) 0.0534 (0.1568)
Land 0.2060 (0.2379) 0.3907 (0.1192) 0.2127 (0.2370)
Manufacturing 0.0976 (0.1251) 0.2206 (0.0378) 0.0965 (0.1248)
Mining 0.0299 (0.2295) 0.1850 (0.1253) 0.0302 (0.2299)
Services 0.0734 (0.1260) 0.2041 (0.0376) 0.0703 (0.1257)
Transportation 0.0727 (0.1490) 0.2330 (0.0656) 0.0735 (0.1488)
Wholesale and retail 0.0645 (0.1234) 0.2170 (0.0342) 0.0630 (0.1231)
Founded1921 -0.0634 (0.0947) 0.0576 (0.0491) -0.0615 (0.0946)
Founded1922 0.0148 (0.1203) 0.0247 (0.0440) 0.0154 (0.1207)
Founded1923 -0.0295 (0.1162) -0.0052 (0.0468) -0.0343 (0.1161)
Founded1924 -0.0210 (0.1127) -0.0163 (0.0400) -0.0167 (0.1121)
Founded1925 -0.0458 (0.0849) -0.0207 (0.0401) -0.0469 (0.0849)
Founded1926 0.0242 (0.0907) -0.0501 (0.0427) 0.0261 (0.0903)
Founded1927 0.0139 (0.0723) 0.0077 (0.0425) 0.0121 (0.0723)
Founded1928 0.0734 (0.0831) 0.0803 (0.0445) 0.0735 (0.0825)
Founded1929 -0.0248 (0.0838) -0.0464 (0.0455) -0.0245 (0.0837)
Founded1930 -0.0582 (0.0749) -0.0445 (0.0460) -0.0595 (0.0751)
Founded1931 0.0098 (0.0908) -0.0338 (0.0509) 0.0093 (0.0909)
Founded1932 0.0525 (0.0750) -0.0097 (0.0487) 0.0484 (0.0750)
Founded1933 0.0291 (0.0817) 0.0081 (0.0496) 0.0265 (0.0817)
Founded1934 -0.0640 (0.0763) -0.0038 (0.0501) -0.0679 (0.0761)
Founded1935 0.0413 (0.0646) 0.0894 (0.0407) 0.0371 (0.0641)
Founded1936 0.0098 (0.0762) 0.0616 (0.0462) 0.0089 (0.0761)
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Table A13: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Only general partnerships
Founded1937 -0.0135 (0.0638) -0.0030 (0.0455) -0.0180 (0.0636)
Founded1938 0.0826 (0.0668) 0.0995 (0.0458) 0.0781 (0.0666)
Founded1939 0.0477 (0.0667) 0.0705 (0.0419) 0.0417 (0.0664)
Founded1940 0.0671 (0.0572) 0.0879 (0.0378) 0.0619 (0.0568)
Founded1941 0.1021 (0.0540) 0.0535 (0.0355) 0.0951 (0.0535)
Founded1942 0.0051 (0.0562) 0.0316 (0.0387) -0.0002 (0.0557)
Founded1943 0.0486 (0.0501) 0.0801 (0.0349) 0.0458 (0.0499)
Founded1944 0.0352 (0.0545) 0.0695 (0.0385) 0.0330 (0.0545)
Founded1945 0.2116 (0.0505) 0.1728 (0.0385) 0.2083 (0.0506)
Constant 0.2800 (0.1617) 0.2023 (0.0379) 0.3637 (0.1238)
Observations 1,843 4,548 1,843
R-squared 0.1044 0.1117 0.1040
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Table A14: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Firms with less than median capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s60
ln(capital) -0.0010 (0.0132)
Corporation 0.4268 (0.1093) 0.4272 (0.1091) 0.4272 (0.1091)
Limited partnership -0.0837 (0.0305) -0.0840 (0.0303) -0.0840 (0.0303)
Share partnership 0.1198 (0.1451) 0.1190 (0.1447) 0.1190 (0.1447)
One general partner 0.1308 (0.0344) 0.1309 (0.0344) 0.1309 (0.0344)
3+ plus general partners -0.0044 (0.0304) -0.0045 (0.0303) -0.0045 (0.0303)
Family firm 0.2274 (0.0294) 0.2273 (0.0292) 0.2273 (0.0292)
2+ experienced partners -0.0779 (0.0398) -0.0782 (0.0397) -0.0782 (0.0397)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.1157 (0.0682) 0.1158 (0.0682) 0.1158 (0.0682)
Prior joint firm⇥Family firm 0.0145 (0.0920) 0.0145 (0.0920) 0.0145 (0.0920)
Muslims + others -0.0834 (0.0653) -0.0835 (0.0653) -0.0835 (0.0653)
Only Muslims 0.0768 (0.0499) 0.0767 (0.0499) 0.0767 (0.0499)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0777 (0.0290) -0.0777 (0.0290) -0.0777 (0.0290)
Cairo 0.0226 (0.0228) 0.0225 (0.0227) 0.0225 (0.0227)
Mansoura 0.1064 (0.0478) 0.1064 (0.0478) 0.1064 (0.0478)
Construction 0.0255 (0.1333) 0.0255 (0.1333) 0.0255 (0.1333)
Cottton trade 0.3091 (0.1231) 0.3086 (0.1228) 0.3086 (0.1228)
Cotton manufacturing 0.1490 (0.2280) 0.1487 (0.2277) 0.1487 (0.2277)
Finance 0.2339 (0.1356) 0.2337 (0.1355) 0.2337 (0.1355)
Land 0.2309 (0.2239) 0.2310 (0.2239) 0.2310 (0.2239)
Manufacturing 0.1957 (0.1012) 0.1956 (0.1011) 0.1956 (0.1011)
Mining 0.1073 (0.2000) 0.1067 (0.1998) 0.1067 (0.1998)
Services 0.1371 (0.1013) 0.1372 (0.1012) 0.1372 (0.1012)
Transportation 0.2403 (0.1205) 0.2402 (0.1204) 0.2402 (0.1204)
Wholesale and retail 0.1587 (0.0990) 0.1587 (0.0989) 0.1587 (0.0989)
Founded1921 -0.0779 (0.0932) -0.0777 (0.0932) -0.0777 (0.0932)
Founded1922 0.1498 (0.0792) 0.1499 (0.0792) 0.1499 (0.0792)
Founded1923 0.0162 (0.0816) 0.0166 (0.0815) 0.0166 (0.0815)
Founded1924 -0.0053 (0.0869) -0.0052 (0.0869) -0.0052 (0.0869)
Founded1925 -0.0422 (0.0761) -0.0421 (0.0760) -0.0421 (0.0760)
Founded1926 0.0181 (0.0937) 0.0179 (0.0936) 0.0179 (0.0936)
Founded1927 0.0413 (0.0749) 0.0413 (0.0749) 0.0413 (0.0749)
Founded1928 0.0721 (0.0745) 0.0722 (0.0745) 0.0722 (0.0745)
Founded1929 0.0222 (0.0753) 0.0222 (0.0752) 0.0222 (0.0752)
Founded1930 0.0211 (0.0816) 0.0213 (0.0815) 0.0213 (0.0815)
Founded1931 -0.0330 (0.0813) -0.0329 (0.0812) -0.0329 (0.0812)
Founded1932 -0.0049 (0.0692) -0.0046 (0.0691) -0.0046 (0.0691)
Founded1933 0.1015 (0.0744) 0.1016 (0.0743) 0.1016 (0.0743)
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Table A14: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Firms with less than median capital
Founded1934 -0.0898 (0.0708) -0.0896 (0.0707) -0.0896 (0.0707)
Founded1935 0.0455 (0.0600) 0.0457 (0.0599) 0.0457 (0.0599)
Founded1936 0.0252 (0.0772) 0.0254 (0.0772) 0.0254 (0.0772)
Founded1937 0.0195 (0.0647) 0.0198 (0.0645) 0.0198 (0.0645)
Founded1938 0.1148 (0.0605) 0.1150 (0.0603) 0.1150 (0.0603)
Founded1939 0.0992 (0.0585) 0.0997 (0.0582) 0.0997 (0.0582)
Founded1940 0.0392 (0.0552) 0.0394 (0.0551) 0.0394 (0.0551)
Founded1941 0.0120 (0.0478) 0.0124 (0.0476) 0.0124 (0.0476)
Founded1942 0.0374 (0.0516) 0.0376 (0.0515) 0.0376 (0.0515)
Founded1943 0.0504 (0.0478) 0.0505 (0.0477) 0.0505 (0.0477)
Founded1944 0.0259 (0.0513) 0.0260 (0.0512) 0.0260 (0.0512)
Founded1945 0.1984 (0.0463) 0.1985 (0.0463) 0.1985 (0.0463)
Constant 0.3057 (0.1719) 0.2946 (0.1015) 0.2946 (0.1015)
Observations 2,204 2,204 2,204
R-squared 0.0799 0.0799 0.0799
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Table A15: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Firms with more than median capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s60
ln(capital) 0.0328 (0.0107)
Corporation 0.3805 (0.0364) 0.4149 (0.0348) 0.4149 (0.0348)
Limited partnership -0.0110 (0.0284) -0.0070 (0.0284) -0.0070 (0.0284)
Share partnership 0.1349 (0.0447) 0.1551 (0.0441) 0.1551 (0.0441)
One general partner 0.0570 (0.0332) 0.0580 (0.0332) 0.0580 (0.0332)
3+ plus general partners -0.0121 (0.0295) -0.0078 (0.0295) -0.0078 (0.0295)
Family firm 0.2012 (0.0287) 0.2105 (0.0285) 0.2105 (0.0285)
2+ experienced partners -0.0540 (0.0294) -0.0468 (0.0293) -0.0468 (0.0293)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0440 (0.0355) 0.0475 (0.0354) 0.0475 (0.0354)
Prior joint firm⇥Family firm -0.0753 (0.0584) -0.0763 (0.0585) -0.0763 (0.0585)
Muslims + others 0.0594 (0.0474) 0.0570 (0.0470) 0.0570 (0.0470)
Only Muslims 0.0665 (0.0407) 0.0779 (0.0405) 0.0779 (0.0405)
Heterogenous non-Muslims 0.0101 (0.0286) 0.0103 (0.0286) 0.0103 (0.0286)
Cairo -0.0046 (0.0204) -0.0050 (0.0204) -0.0050 (0.0204)
Mansoura 0.1769 (0.0519) 0.1675 (0.0517) 0.1675 (0.0517)
Construction 0.1535 (0.1138) 0.1689 (0.1152) 0.1689 (0.1152)
Cottton trade 0.1218 (0.1077) 0.1413 (0.1091) 0.1413 (0.1091)
Cotton manufacturing 0.0805 (0.1295) 0.1040 (0.1295) 0.1040 (0.1295)
Finance 0.1814 (0.1113) 0.2062 (0.1123) 0.2062 (0.1123)
Land 0.2355 (0.1179) 0.2608 (0.1183) 0.2608 (0.1183)
Manufacturing 0.1301 (0.1035) 0.1349 (0.1050) 0.1349 (0.1050)
Mining 0.2540 (0.1226) 0.2580 (0.1245) 0.2580 (0.1245)
Services 0.1318 (0.1045) 0.1355 (0.1059) 0.1355 (0.1059)
Transportation 0.1251 (0.1114) 0.1282 (0.1126) 0.1282 (0.1126)
Wholesale and retail 0.1553 (0.1016) 0.1588 (0.1031) 0.1588 (0.1031)
Founded1921 -0.0114 (0.0826) -0.0070 (0.0828) -0.0070 (0.0828)
Founded1922 0.0583 (0.0688) 0.0599 (0.0697) 0.0599 (0.0697)
Founded1923 -0.1935 (0.0766) -0.1905 (0.0779) -0.1905 (0.0779)
Founded1924 0.0232 (0.0674) 0.0235 (0.0671) 0.0235 (0.0671)
Founded1925 -0.0679 (0.0633) -0.0651 (0.0636) -0.0651 (0.0636)
Founded1926 -0.0578 (0.0656) -0.0623 (0.0654) -0.0623 (0.0654)
Founded1927 -0.0416 (0.0596) -0.0442 (0.0602) -0.0442 (0.0602)
Founded1928 -0.0528 (0.0639) -0.0482 (0.0638) -0.0482 (0.0638)
Founded1929 0.0515 (0.0605) 0.0585 (0.0603) 0.0585 (0.0603)
Founded1930 0.0540 (0.0589) 0.0562 (0.0587) 0.0562 (0.0587)
Founded1931 0.0492 (0.0613) 0.0523 (0.0622) 0.0523 (0.0622)
Founded1932 0.0213 (0.0644) 0.0170 (0.0643) 0.0170 (0.0643)
Founded1933 0.0232 (0.0711) 0.0205 (0.0714) 0.0205 (0.0714)
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Table A15: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Firms with more than median capital
Founded1934 0.0331 (0.0552) 0.0315 (0.0555) 0.0315 (0.0555)
Founded1935 0.1054 (0.0595) 0.0987 (0.0595) 0.0987 (0.0595)
Founded1936 -0.0142 (0.0619) -0.0148 (0.0617) -0.0148 (0.0617)
Founded1937 0.1133 (0.0520) 0.1096 (0.0520) 0.1096 (0.0520)
Founded1938 0.0665 (0.0562) 0.0681 (0.0562) 0.0681 (0.0562)
Founded1939 0.0161 (0.0629) 0.0075 (0.0625) 0.0075 (0.0625)
Founded1940 0.0758 (0.0643) 0.0679 (0.0643) 0.0679 (0.0643)
Founded1941 0.1120 (0.0595) 0.1038 (0.0598) 0.1038 (0.0598)
Founded1942 0.0144 (0.0545) 0.0133 (0.0545) 0.0133 (0.0545)
Founded1943 0.0085 (0.0510) 0.0083 (0.0511) 0.0083 (0.0511)
Founded1944 0.0678 (0.0492) 0.0682 (0.0493) 0.0682 (0.0493)
Founded1945 0.1950 (0.0423) 0.1967 (0.0424) 0.1967 (0.0424)
Constant -0.0920 (0.1700) 0.3203 (0.1047) 0.3203 (0.1047)
Observations 2,203 2,203 2,203
R-squared 0.1374 0.1342 0.1342
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Table A16: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Wholesale and retail firms only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s60
ln(capital) 0.0109 (0.0084)
Corporation 0.5100 (0.0492) 0.5209 (0.0363) 0.5312 (0.0460)
Limited partnership -0.0141 (0.0291) -0.0177 (0.0207) -0.0095 (0.0289)
Share partnership 0.1594 (0.0616) 0.1797 (0.0553) 0.1784 (0.0596)
One general partner 0.1101 (0.0333) 0.0851 (0.0248) 0.1103 (0.0334)
3+ plus general partners 0.0433 (0.0300) 0.0102 (0.0195) 0.0475 (0.0299)
Family firm 0.2494 (0.0283) 0.2600 (0.0184) 0.2557 (0.0277)
2+ experienced partners -0.0934 (0.0357) -0.0388 (0.0253) -0.0874 (0.0355)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0620 (0.0583) 0.0145 (0.0435) 0.0645 (0.0583)
Prior joint firm*Family firm -0.0830 (0.0776) -0.0570 (0.0576) -0.0843 (0.0774)
Muslims + others 0.0415 (0.0616) 0.0156 (0.0483) 0.0424 (0.0614)
Only Muslims 0.0580 (0.0416) 0.0814 (0.0284) 0.0629 (0.0416)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0719 (0.0301) -0.0652 (0.0207) -0.0715 (0.0301)
Cairo 0.0066 (0.0219) 0.0217 (0.0147) 0.0061 (0.0219)
Mansoura 0.2028 (0.0481) 0.1507 (0.0371) 0.1987 (0.0478)
Founded1921 -0.0786 (0.0772) -0.0265 (0.0481) -0.0779 (0.0774)
Founded1922 0.0598 (0.0679) 0.0172 (0.0422) 0.0582 (0.0681)
Founded1923 -0.1848 (0.0754) -0.0551 (0.0441) -0.1875 (0.0749)
Founded1924 0.0150 (0.0713) 0.0264 (0.0419) 0.0166 (0.0712)
Founded1925 0.0253 (0.0660) 0.0192 (0.0403) 0.0269 (0.0662)
Founded1926 -0.0635 (0.0829) -0.0601 (0.0468) -0.0618 (0.0828)
Founded1927 -0.0829 (0.0658) -0.0349 (0.0417) -0.0834 (0.0661)
Founded1928 0.0430 (0.0639) 0.1060 (0.0422) 0.0431 (0.0637)
Founded1929 0.0527 (0.0685) 0.0166 (0.0460) 0.0510 (0.0685)
Founded1930 0.0390 (0.0653) 0.0740 (0.0449) 0.0389 (0.0652)
Founded1931 0.0060 (0.0694) 0.0236 (0.0472) 0.0066 (0.0693)
Founded1932 0.0132 (0.0668) -0.0154 (0.0468) 0.0099 (0.0670)
Founded1933 0.0775 (0.0737) 0.0625 (0.0465) 0.0749 (0.0740)
Founded1934 -0.0282 (0.0661) 0.0222 (0.0441) -0.0310 (0.0664)
Founded1935 0.1631 (0.0586) 0.0800 (0.0403) 0.1571 (0.0584)
Founded1936 0.0335 (0.0729) 0.0792 (0.0493) 0.0336 (0.0726)
Founded1937 0.1056 (0.0579) 0.0645 (0.0468) 0.1010 (0.0578)
Founded1938 0.1102 (0.0629) 0.0662 (0.0454) 0.1053 (0.0625)
Founded1939 0.0648 (0.0585) 0.0728 (0.0422) 0.0547 (0.0578)
Founded1940 0.0644 (0.0574) 0.0753 (0.0404) 0.0571 (0.0570)
Founded1941 0.0529 (0.0505) 0.0710 (0.0376) 0.0454 (0.0502)
Founded1942 0.0314 (0.0553) 0.0496 (0.0412) 0.0250 (0.0550)
Founded1943 0.0693 (0.0513) 0.1104 (0.0380) 0.0673 (0.0512)
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Table A16: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Wholesale and retail firms only
Founded1944 0.0787 (0.0568) 0.0823 (0.0431) 0.0755 (0.0568)
Founded1945 0.2157 (0.0450) 0.2102 (0.0373) 0.2136 (0.0451)
Constant 0.3015 (0.1031) 0.4222 (0.0221) 0.4254 (0.0338)
Observations 2,140 4,480 2,140
R-squared 0.1081 0.0881 0.1074
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Table A17: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Wholesale/retail and services only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Sub-sample se Firms w/ k se Firms w/ k se
s60
ln(capital) 0.0139 (0.0073)
Corporation 0.4752 (0.0395) 0.5136 (0.0293) 0.5022 (0.0369)
Limited partnership -0.0319 (0.0255) -0.0299 (0.0184) -0.0247 (0.0253)
Share partnership 0.1891 (0.0540) 0.2183 (0.0487) 0.2147 (0.0524)
One general partner 0.0839 (0.0291) 0.0815 (0.0219) 0.0837 (0.0291)
3+ plus general partners 0.0179 (0.0261) -0.0010 (0.0173) 0.0221 (0.0261)
Family firm 0.2211 (0.0250) 0.2534 (0.0166) 0.2288 (0.0246)
2+ experienced partners -0.0773 (0.0314) -0.0189 (0.0223) -0.0696 (0.0313)
Pair with prior joint firm 0.0690 (0.0477) 0.0240 (0.0362) 0.0729 (0.0476)
Prior joint firm*Family firm -0.0767 (0.0677) -0.1028 (0.0509) -0.0763 (0.0675)
Muslims + others 0.0205 (0.0554) -0.0081 (0.0439) 0.0219 (0.0553)
Only Muslims 0.0616 (0.0395) 0.0676 (0.0271) 0.0678 (0.0394)
Heterogenous non-Muslims -0.0791 (0.0256) -0.0811 (0.0178) -0.0786 (0.0256)
Cairo -0.0041 (0.0190) 0.0227 (0.0130) -0.0050 (0.0190)
Mansoura 0.1373 (0.0434) 0.1075 (0.0328) 0.1327 (0.0433)
Services -0.0203 (0.0215) -0.0319 (0.0153) -0.0216 (0.0215)
Founded1921 -0.0838 (0.0727) -0.0191 (0.0432) -0.0824 (0.0728)
Founded1922 0.1108 (0.0640) 0.0250 (0.0386) 0.1073 (0.0642)
Founded1923 -0.1359 (0.0696) -0.0368 (0.0408) -0.1410 (0.0689)
Founded1924 -0.0087 (0.0638) 0.0006 (0.0368) -0.0094 (0.0638)
Founded1925 -0.0144 (0.0589) 0.0119 (0.0356) -0.0128 (0.0591)
Founded1926 0.0066 (0.0684) -0.0107 (0.0397) 0.0083 (0.0685)
Founded1927 -0.0493 (0.0590) -0.0016 (0.0377) -0.0494 (0.0593)
Founded1928 0.0445 (0.0575) 0.1104 (0.0380) 0.0447 (0.0572)
Founded1929 0.0332 (0.0620) 0.0370 (0.0416) 0.0321 (0.0619)
Founded1930 0.0275 (0.0611) 0.0612 (0.0413) 0.0279 (0.0609)
Founded1931 0.0407 (0.0626) 0.0408 (0.0430) 0.0425 (0.0627)
Founded1932 0.0052 (0.0613) -0.0130 (0.0423) 0.0009 (0.0617)
Founded1933 0.0475 (0.0638) 0.0530 (0.0414) 0.0455 (0.0639)
Founded1934 -0.0221 (0.0582) 0.0234 (0.0400) -0.0264 (0.0586)
Founded1935 0.1016 (0.0528) 0.0658 (0.0363) 0.0934 (0.0525)
Founded1936 0.0410 (0.0623) 0.0708 (0.0424) 0.0388 (0.0620)
Founded1937 0.1090 (0.0523) 0.0816 (0.0415) 0.1030 (0.0523)
Founded1938 0.1089 (0.0570) 0.0722 (0.0404) 0.1022 (0.0565)
Founded1939 0.0993 (0.0523) 0.0986 (0.0379) 0.0859 (0.0516)
Founded1940 0.0885 (0.0511) 0.0922 (0.0363) 0.0794 (0.0510)
Founded1941 0.0493 (0.0432) 0.0541 (0.0323) 0.0393 (0.0430)
Founded1942 0.0346 (0.0451) 0.0419 (0.0340) 0.0276 (0.0449)
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Table A17: 60-month survival of cohorts 1916–45
Wholesale/retail and services only
Founded1943 0.0264 (0.0432) 0.0704 (0.0329) 0.0240 (0.0432)
Founded1944 0.0321 (0.0445) 0.0608 (0.0349) 0.0290 (0.0445)
Founded1945 0.2087 (0.0385) 0.1974 (0.0321) 0.2056 (0.0387)
Constant 0.3035 (0.0897) 0.4337 (0.0201) 0.4619 (0.0306)
Observations 2,850 5,817 2,850
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Coe~ :lif:~;rizio} & F1gli?, dcnrl-t"~ <:'~~-
nia les farinC',i, 2. r . P,rn_na. fl'a:I l ' 0 1 • 
5,tOO, ·im t:.;, ,loin . Rport.mg Club, [ill 
2727. Coen (RoJ1111t.·l J\. ) . :I la T...11).vds Rank, 
clom. r. ~rnw boul . t 496? , . 
c,icn (V,ia). tit ulairc Ile la in111son V1ln 
Coen & } ' ii!(, dor11 . i\Toust.:i ra pacha 
(Hnmleh), ~tl] ] .8·1~. . . 
Coen (V11:1) l ' J• 1gli, _dellrecs coloni.alcs, 
fa rines . i . IJ4"JUI. Fta1d . I e r, 6486 \\: 
G5:!J fU.l J.1.11. • 
CQ('nea' (J oseph). agent t ransiLe ire . 11. 
r. Souk rl 'J'ork . fill 150, d nm. 8, r . 
Hassan pacfot c·l-lsknnclarnni . •. 
(!Qu-he (J.,uicil. cornptnhle de la ma1son 
Fratelli :\fati atia , . dom. V illa ]>Jaisan-
cc Station Schulz (Rnrnlehl. 
Coh~n (A.). avocat, 7, r . de la gare du 
Caire. 
C't>hen /AILert M.l . e111ploye c·hez B,x-k. 
)fn nson , · H ornblower l~td .. 
Cohen (Alllhonsc J .), r. Souk el ,Akka 
<line. G371. 
Cohen (A.N.) , cle la. maison J. H Perez 
& Co .. dom. !!ill 3730. 
Cohen ICIC1nent,), a.vocat. 7. r . Gare ch 
Caire. rm:J 823. cfom, r: Abo11kir, Villa 
Cohen. R port,ing Clul,, t 1668. 
Colien (Daniel), avocat. a la Cour, de 
l_'etude Colncci &. Cohen. 2, r . Eglise 
Ecossaise, 41 i6 et 2G,,, [U] 798, 
dom. l bral11 mieh . rrm 356G. 
Cohen (Da,·id 8.). prop . de l'African 
Bazar. plun1~ cl 'aulrucl1e , manufact11 -
res orientales. 7G, r. cle la l\fnrine. 
ohen (Ed':.) , Cpicicr. vins et liqueurR. 
12. r. i\lnl1111011cl pnchn r l-Falaki. r@ 
511. 
Cohen (Felix A.} . neg. en mannfiwt nre,:; 
6, r. Mawla i i\lvha 111ecl . J!ill iJ575. J..r) 
1.JOl, dom. r. h(Jpita l :\fennst<" (\fo. 
harrern bey). 
C<•heu Frotell i & Co .. nei;. -rommiss .. 3, 
r. eglisf' Maronit.e . rtm 573:J, (UJ 1433 
Cohen Fratelli & C(). nCg.·comni iss.: 
n1an ufact ures . 18 r. N11bnr pachn. ,rm 
; 642~ 1433. dorn . 7 houl. Snid_ ICT, 
Cohen FrC.rcs & Cn. , nCg. en manufac-
l11res , 2, r. ) l irona. rug 5100. co;;:iJH.M.), lailleur, 33, passage 
Cvhen Osaa(· & Felix A.) . nCu.-co111m . . 
111:rnufa<:tu rt>s . 4. r. :\hwlni l\folrnnwd . 
Jill 5575. [fEJ J.J01. dorn r hOpital 
Is raelite (Moharrcrn bey).' · 
eo;e! ,.iid:~.H .), mercerie, bo nnelerie, 
('f,l!f'n (,Jaco_L J ._). ~ucc-rs. d ' Al,r. ~'= Alph. 
\1'1Cn, <11111wa1Jlcr1e . 1 1 r . Souk el-'lork . l!fil 2Mll, do,n. rtn, r. Mohar 
rem bey, fiE 1452. 
Cohen (J11.cqueA A. ) & Co., nCg. en rna-
nufacturP<.i . r. Vorl,E ,., , im1u. Ahmed 
Salem !!m ~)54. dom. 74, r. Fouad 
k, !!ill 2956. 
Col1en (.Jneqncs_ David M.), prop. de 
The O~d Cur1os1t.r Fil1np. soierjes , plu-
mP11 rl rn,t r11chcs, 3, boul. cle Jlarnlch. 
ALEXANDRIE ~1il0- ALEXANDRrE COM 
Colavolpe (Dr. AlCo~eo) , .. mCdecin nu 
Cohen (J oseph}, etc la m11.ison Vita Coeu Conseil Quarantena1re, 81 1 r . Salab el-
,\: Fils . clom. l\foustafa pacba. (Ram Dine trill 1170. 
leh). !!ill R. 1812. · . Cole /T.K) . direcleur de l& Llo)•ds 
Cohon (Leon E .l. nCg.-commiss., 2, r. Si· Bank Ltd .. rug 5164. dom. F leming 
nan pa.cha 682. · (Ifomlch ). . . 
Cc,hen (Mou'riee A.} , chez Aghion Ff6 Colen~ (N.). de In matSC?ll Ch. M1 tarnchi 
res. clon1. r. Stamhoul. Co .. 10. r. Sesnsl r1~. [IE cmn. 
(,)hen {:\fa<,.soucl) ,t: E'ilR, nrnnnfacture'i . Colegnio (A.L epicier, 20, r. cles .. ~oour,L 
('torfos . t issw, . 18 . r . CThcrinni. . Colin (L.P.A. ), (succrs. de lutegor ). 
Cohen Ofaurice K'. l , 8$':~ociC de In- ma1· a.mcublements, 3 5, r. F ouad Ier, m!) 
son R o11 lln11 & Cohen, drnn. r . du 4282, l[fJ 73l. . Te:nplc ( i rccn (Mohancm he~·). . Coliniatis (P.L cordon ncnc. ] , r. llnghch C<,hcn (Maurice) & Co . . n11,;!'-·CO!lllll1SS., 
1. r. 1\fos<pd•e AUari 11e . rft 11!H. Tul HI. &. :Martin , ma.rohnndR I.nil 
Cvhen (Moi"sc C.I. iniport.-export, fl. 111. leurs. 7. r . 1;-ouad Tcr. ruf.l 40J8. 
1\fohnmccl Al:v. ruQ 2fY.t:J, cloni. 7. ~· 1~~- Collnros (An t.) , dom. 1.8, r . Ma.r1etle pn. 
tornlerani (J\fohnrrc ,n hoy) . l.rn fl;::i~. cha !El G27R 
c~~1~t:k t!t,~~ki~d~/o~ic;:,ni~n~r~: ;~;.· CollnrOs (B.), 8, r. Egliae Pebbanc, m!J 
Cohen {N .). bureau de change, IJ place ('~gf~\:nER ( \'oir nn ~ Profesi:dons) . 
Mohamed Aly. . ColleY (J.H.) . ingCn1cur ~ntrcJ)reneur 
C<>hen 'Raoul R.). & Co .. neg . comnnss. rlirCCt. de In. Ueliance Trading Agency, 
6, r. Mawlai Mohamed. !!ill 306, 5, , . Adib. ll'ill 8172, l[l'J 1784, dom. !ill J2~1 , clom. i 152. Sporl.in~ Club. . . . C1,hcn (Ra, rnond) . di rc<'l"ur de la Vic- Collin (Emile) , lnnssier au tribunal 
lorin rle . Herl in ft . r. ChCrif pncho. Mixte de lre instance. . 
rfill 5014, ffiE ·17\ . 7, r. Coll ins (John Edounrd). sous -cl1 rccteu r C«tr1{1~(1~c11:r). cou eurs, \"('TlllS , de la Commercia l 1311.nk or the Near 
S ·11 83 Cl c.r·f E asi Lid. . , 4!HO, (UJ 068. Cohen (, .). tn1 cnr. . , passage 1 i . Collins (P.V), professeur a_ux: Ecoles ro-~:f;~<t'.~1rf ~f~~~~;~/:i:c '~;:~:~: ~°3j0gom. 65, ,'· Cesar1on, ~leopatra, 
i.iu t ic I'ctrolenm Co. Lt.<1 ., clom. ,. Colloricli bey (Dr. G.). medeein-_cbirur-
Sta.mhoul. · · j:l'ien, dCh!guJ cl'Tt.nl ie nu Oonseil Qua.-
Cohen (Samuel J .). nCg. en mannfaetu- rnntenaire. 2, r. g Arc du Caire , t!fil 960. 
r es , r. l\fawlai i\fohnmccl, (!E 1205. ColomlJos n)r. Ale x .• J.). mCdccin , 1 , r. 
Cohrn (Sasson S. ) . o.' mmcr~·nnt ' 50, r. de la Post<' . [!'ill 31 32. . ~on!, el-MaghnrnLn. Colonia l l'holo St,orci. ('rhc). fourn1iures 
C'< hcn-'roiiss icli (,lncq11es) . rCClnetcur en pour pl1oto~rapl1e..'I , 8J , boul. llamleh . <·her d(' Ja rc\luc cCinCmu , dom. r Coloni 11l Trnding Coy, n,·anccs aur mar-
Aln•clo.ti.. . chandises. 1, r . P irone , rml 228. 
C'ohcfl (\ 'ict,,r A.l. assurances. 14. r. Colonimos (Jnc<p1es P .). del a maison P. 
Mahmoml "1-Faluki pnchn. rrilJ 5255. Coloni111os & Fils , <lorn . 42, 1fnzarita, 
clom. r . Mnl11noud el-Toubgui pacha, !'F.ill 4G{ifl. ,rm 62!>H. [rn ;Ji4 . Colonirnos (PAcifico) . clc la. maison P. 
('oh"n (Victor M.). cnissic.r de l'Ens.lern Cok,nimos ~'= l1'ils 42, r . l\faznrita., 
R xp<"irt Co .. clom. 14. r . Ebn c l-Rh3J.· 4450. · f;ab. C'olonimo~ (P. ) & F ils, banqu iers , n eg.· 
C'nl1cn (Vita & L.-'>t ,n ). pnpclerie. impri- commis, .. irnport,-exoorl,. . 10, r . An· 
nicric , 11apier~. 4. r. cle F rance, [ml cicnnc Bourse. JJI] 884, l[fJ 030. 
21 &'1. fB1J 65. Colcnna (Armando). a.voc.o.t, 2, r. E-
C'ol1c.n O'aeo11l1 'Y1111$':~en . nCI,!'. en mann- ~li~c J.:coAsn i~e . rrffi 264. 
fnct.urP~. 49. r . el-Miclan . 1452. C.olonua. (C. ) . vins . )iquorus , 8 , r. War· 
Oohcn (Yahiel M.) , mercerie, 12, r. Sonk chct cl-1'011hguich. 
cl-Siaref. Cc.Jonna (G iuseppe} , p rop. de The Shef· 
Cohen (Z .) , & Bros, prop. cle l& Cordon- field H ouse, c:outcllcric et a.iguiseur, 
ncrie Angla.ise, ch aussures . cl1emises , 11, r. 1.1011fis<111n pacha .. 
etc .. 10, r. Mos~uce AU.arine, l!l!l 467. Colom10 (M.) , coutelleric, 29, boul. ,le 





· .. lnines. pcaux, JO, r . Attarinc , !r!f1 Colucci (C; ui<lo), nt'a . -cornmiss .. 4 , r . Go-
u 111<:<:i, !!ill 3320, ffi1l 1263, <10111. 8, ,. 
Cchcnc.:a (GitH'OlllO Fils). eledricite et Sal>ri pacha. 
g:az. 4, r. de la puste , lTtJl 2634 et 18. Colucci tPanll, a.voent a la. C<.ur, de 1·e-
r . Re~ostris . f:n 11 37. [Ul 561. tuclo Colucci & Cohen 2 r. de l'Egliso 
C'ohcnca. Dfoisc1 secrCLaire de I 'Amcri- E c.:ossaire. !!.JD 261. ' ' 
ca n Mad 1ine & l"ounclry, dom. 8. r. ('olumhi11 nrnmophone Co. Lt<l ., (abri· 
Rkendcrnnj. cants de disq ucK et gremopl1ones . 2, 
C.ohilio (C.), nCg. en su\'On. r . ?.fineL "I- r . Egl ise G recqne, [ill 4956 , [[fl 1965. 
Ua..-.sa l. Colvin (P.G.). ing. en chef an service 
C'okinaki (C.). 1,.:hcf-cn111plnblc de la mai - des pompiers. 
i.on ,v. F . Vnncler Z"e, clom. 14, houl Comanos bey (A.), chef du parquet A la. 
de Rarnlcli . Cour cl'}\ppel Mixlc, <lorn. Sao-Stefa..· Cokinl'I~ Frt.'res , nel!. -cornmiss ., denrfos no . .!!ill U. 67. . 
c6lonialcu. . r. el-Mi,lun, Okelle L e- Con.rn.nos (M.A.). avocaL. ]7, r . N ~bi Da· 
rnoun, "ill 1601. [)i1'1 4n2. niel, ir,n 2!187. clom. Carlton , l!'l!l n. 67. 
co;inN:b~~nr;~Zi1~~ C.), cordonnerie, 1, Comas (V .R .)' inuCnicur, expert, entr~_. 
Cokkalis &. Rnillidfa , n~g.-oommiss 1 preneur. l _l. pl. Mohamed Aly. m9 73:J, 
r. Cheikh Soliman paeha. . ' J orn. 18 his , r . Ruttan Hnsacin. 
Colac~l~ia (F,t,t.oreL cliez Banco Italo- Coma.t i O~lie). cMJ/.un6 cle l ' AgricuUur:11 Egizuino. l~a.nk_of Egypt , 535, 1lom. r . Atta-
Ji
·; TOiiiQUf ET RtCilill"ITOANT ft .Ill>; '°"" 
• '""'"' EXCELLENCE . ' N,QL, 
Jlecem.m.and• par I•• w,declaa M•zzou .... , 
rrnc, mun . clea VVokfs R oyaux, m!J 179:). 
DEPOT .G£N£UL POUR L' £'1PTE ET LE SIUDAI : 
FERROL • 36, Rue EI-Maghraby, 36 
LB CAIRE • • T416phone No 3445 " 
COM Aii!IXANDRlF. - 151- ALEXANDRrn CON 
"' Com~o (l!:)i c~1cf _d~ f:c_rvi('o do la 'BiLlio-I Co.mpng_ nie d ' Assuronces GCnCrales (vie, Comptoir d:HorJoguie et de Biiout.eri• U1~<1 uc u. a1\_fumcmaht.e_, dom. tE!] 5G8fl. 11:lCCntlie ct accidents) , P . Grod_y & Co., Frn.nco-Su1sAC, lfona11ean & Franrks 
Com1L6_ O~mp1quo Egypt1cn, 6 , r. Bola- d1rccteur11 parliculie.rs pour l 'E~to t J ,_ r . de I& Podo (pl. Mohamed A1yi'. 
nacl11 , ·;t1 1728. lo Souclnn, 4, r. Ntibi Daniel l!fil 732. 26,J4 , IIfj 686. 
Co1pmerc1a. Ba.n~.. or Egypt. (Ba.nque Compagnie CcnLrale d 'Eclairag'.e et de Compt-0ir lnt.ern•tional de dedouana.ge 
9 ommcr~rn.lo <1 h g~•plo, (Soc.. Anon). C~~urrago par le Ga1, Lebon & Cic. , r . trasp.-ex()Cd. et tranait, Nahum t S.: 
JO, r. l iouad Tcr, mTl chrcct.100 1847 , Suh el,Meb:alli , tm} 6201 , [IE 241 lnma., 1, r. Pirona , !IE 811. 
hurcn11 . 277. IEE GIB. (\·oir pnrt io orriciclle)--:- ' ' Cornptoir -Ki nema Location, AlLilio O. 
C1~111ncrcrnl l1a.nk or the Near East. Ll-d. Compngnic, l!:gypt.ienne, matCrianx de Iluociant i, 73, r . F ouad l er, e 298. 
,1, r. Sta1nlxi11J , rsJ 437fi, diroot.. 4371. conRlruct ion, 20, r . Abou Darcla.r , tm} Compl.oir L .,•on-Alomnnd (8 .A.) , ruCt&u:1; 11!.l:l OC,Jl (v. parhe ofric;clle). 5737. precicux, 17 , pl. Mohame<l Aly, 1!ffi 
C:om111crcrnl Co1npany o( E gypt, ,~x por! . Compa~nic d'Enlrepriscs Commcrcinles 540-2, 13, r . Sonk el-Akkadine (Midanl 
tlo coton, ($.A.). n, r . Stnmboul , en 1:;gypte , S.A. engrnis chimi,1ucfl , ct quai No. 17, !IE 778. 
G28 , rrm l ~!Ul , I 73, 4403. oxporlateur" fcrs , 1uatfril\llX do Con$truct.ion 4, r . Co1n pt.oir Mn.riiime & Commercial d 'E · ct nCg. on col.onR, ngon t~ Ile Ii~ Cie cl'A ~- Bolonncl1i, 750 & 4801 {vol; parl ic P'."P' c , Adolfo Lanzillo & Co" agence 
i:rnrnnco «l?ulntJ ne> {Jncendie) . ortieicllc) . T t rt t ·t g 
C er i1 I T1 1po t. (, A M a &, C Co l a · 1,' · 1 N · l' a 0" .'",1'1', 011011c0e',. ',"." 8 J?Og1·,,'e •. ~0a'ro1n',·•-v,oy1·m'm• . c~~1J~ '. -~ ~mis~ .• l , r ~-P i;o~a,~r< o . o,, '~~~~1~;1,1cCyp~n11J~hr~ ~c C~-~v1~)j~r,n & Ea m . w . 
Commerciol lnsuranco Company of Ire· Y.eh;l nsenLs, 6, r . ' hcrif pacb,, l!!ll Monferrnlo. l!l!l 6569, llll 1124· 
ll\nd L t <l . , amalgamCo 3VCC l& York • 78, (UJ 3H4. Co~-~l~t~.ir c~::ir0; !ct~~itN~ec<f!onp'aii: 
flh irc Jmrnr1tnce Cy., inccncl ic, acci· Con1pagn1e Fnrnt;ai8e pour l 'approvision- [IE 503, (voir parlie offidelle) . 
dents , maritime. A. Sierra. & Co., nerncnt dcM navires en Orient, 17, r . Comptoir l)aris , nCg.-commiss. , import.-
A~cnls gOn~r n.ux, 26, r. Eglisc Copte, Port.-Rst, 20J4, (ll1 1667. exporL. , 4, r. Tewfik. rug 3071, [HJ 598. C(J111pai:!'nie l:iri,:coriJique cl'Egypte, r. Cn. Comploir de Tapia d'Oricnt, .T .N. h,fuasa. 
C'omn\creial 7'.fot..or , , r . NCbi Daniel, nal Mahmoudioh. bini. tapiK de Verse et de Smyrne, 30 
nt.cliera. r . 1lu l\fox. [!'ID 3526. Comt>agnie H elleniquo d'ent reprises Ma- r. l!'ouad ler. mfl 4881. 
Commercial Secretary to the Residency, rillmes , Navigation Palios , 8 , pl. :Mo Comptoir Universe} pour le Commerce et 
17, r. Stamboul. hnmed Aly. l'Im1u! Lric, nC17. -commiss .. import.-e't· 
Commercial Stores of Egypt , nCg.-com- Compagnie llalo-l::gy11tienne, taillours, port, 8, r. Rglise DebbanC, 6096, 
misfl . 18, r . Nubnr Pacha, mg 4807, 27, r. 'l'ewrik I.er . (Ul l4G4. IJJJ 1736. Compagnie Maritime Coloniale l Mar- Cornploir de Vitre ric el Miroit.erie d '~. 
Cmnmcrcinl U nion of America. I nsurance seille. 2, r . Tew!ik l cr. gyptc , 42 . r .Trnam Aly, m!} 2860. 
Alexandre PandCJicles , ·ngent gCni ral ; Cornpagnio des Messageries Maritimes, 1, Concetl" ('l 1ova.ni Gozzini), maseuse, J , 
\l, boul. Ramleh . r . Fouad Jer , ll!!1 1347 et 4507 /Passa, r . Tr;e,le. l!l!l 2878. 
Commercial Union Assura.ncc Co. Ltd., gers) 134.7, marchandises , ME 198, Condonis {Ant,. l\L) & Co., neg.-com 
(branchc maritime). agents : Alexandria (voir p~rtie o~ficielle) . miss . . 20, r . · Stnmhoul, r@ 1519, ([E 
Commercial C-0. (S.A.) . 9, r . Stam- Compagme ~ .allonale Belge de T r~n~- 1662, dom . 22, houl. de Ramleh. 
boul , flJ!J 4403, riE 623. ' P?rts Ma~1t1mes, agent_genCral, L • Cie Condos (D.1:"..) . cl1arbons de bois, n~g.-
Commcrcial Union Assurance Co. Ltd., d Entrepr1ses qommer;t}t.les en ~gypte, commu!s . a~ent mant.ime, 2, r . An&li.· 
i ncendic, Carver Brot,hers Co. , L td.I 4, r . _Bolonachi.~ rrill ,50, Qua1 Mah• l~s,, rrffi 3792, 1uJ 848, clom. M&ZI · 
agents 17 . r . Stamboul . mom11e!,, rfill .54 t0. . ... r1ta.. . 1. Commer~i81 Union Assurance Co. L td , Compagn1_e N&ti?nale du Nil. Aly . bey_ C,,ntlos (:Michel J.), Ilourse M1net el· 
{vie) Divid Rote Sorts, P ort-Est (Non- S&adam HaL1b, transports Ouv1aux . B assnl. , . . 
vea.u' quai) 14, Porte de la Douane. [00 54~. Condos (N.D.} & Co., ncg.-commu,s:, 1, 
Co · t & Ag ncv Co of Egypt Ltd Cornpagnie Ro,•ale Belgo-Anient me, B· r Nubar pncha. ~n~?~:~miss., e illlpori- export. ' sac~ 11ent gen.~rat' Com~agnie d'Enlreprisea Condole~n {~piridion), employC lt. la Ban-
su:res, riz, IO, r. Genera.1 Earle, lim Com!"erc1ales en E ~ypte. 4, r; Bolo- que cl Athcnes. . . 1721 de~t 5572 l[fJ 601 (voir part,e nach1 , l!l!l 750, Qua, Mabmoudieh, l!l!l Condra,. Frere, .. c~1c1ers, 40, r . Abdel · ' 11 ' ' 540. . l\fe~'U1d, (lbrah~m1eb). . . 
Coofficie _e)\ & E t te Co of Egypt CGmpagnie Ronle NPerlandaise de Na.vi- Cc.ncglinno (Bcttmo). eptrepnsea U1tSti· 
Lld_er( J:te 8 . K:r!m 8 & Fr~res . bois .I~ ,zation t. Vipeur d 'Amsterde.m, W .F . L1 nles.- prop, du Thelltre Alhambra , 1 . i t..i Wardia.n (Mex DOU· Van der Zee, aQ'ent, 8. boul. de Ram· r . Musse.la . rrfil ai26, [l1J 1520. d cons ruQo ?."'· lfil1 809ll t 695 'IIJ'l 14 (ch l!i!) 4310, Ill) 1074. Conegliano (Raoul M.J,. e,portat..ur . • ve~u ufiJ, ffici 11 ) e ' ComPasmes de · No.vigations , (voir aux chiffons. 011 . coufs , lames, 3. r . Egbse vmr p~r 10 o icrn e . d'Al rofessions) ?\foronite rr;n a.f.66. ([f) 586, dom. Camp 
Comwis~1on do la ~urso Royale C· C:m aniou ,s:) l" Co .. n6g.-commisa .• 26, de Cl..sa; . - rrm 4496. . 
x.ndne .. 0, place ~Io)' jj)ed Aly, !!ill bor,l. ~e Ramleh. !@ 1953, ~420. Conegliano (Silvio. E.) , neg.,comm1u., 
407,. (v,01r partie o tc1c e. . ] Cm toir Automobile, R. De Martino & import. u gente r1e en gros. H, pl. 
Cmnm1ss1on ,de l a. B;ourse R oynleM lt~ oCop 71. r. Abdel Moneim, rug 965, Mohaniell Aly• ttill 14.85, (lll 1.0~. 
Vnlcurs d Alexandno, 9. plac~ 0 ~- [[f]' 1801 Confiance (L a), Cie d'anura.nce, (vie et 111cd. A,IY, l!m 407, IIll 878, (voir parlie Comptoir a~ Commerce et de l'Industrie, incendie) , agent gfoer&l pour !'Egypt.. 
adm,1 m.stratwe). . . E {en liquid.) neg.-commiss., 10, r. A· Const. Gonlakis, A, r. A,·erort, CommIBSIOQ Commerc,ale Suisse e_n .- b D lnr l!1!l 1426 1Il'l 816 382•1 
gr_pte. 5, r , ~bh2 oud Pe.cha el-F a lak,. Cor~~toi/r(o~ meJcial EsJl>tien . . neg.· Cc.nidi~ (Aristide) . neg. en col~ns. i:s; 
l!!!l 0026, IIlJ l o 5. . . . t m'tniss •l r Nabi Daniel, !!l!l 3452, port.-export., l, r . Champolhon. , ""' CommonwcalU1 Dom1mon Lrnc, . ag~n s (IE 571 ·• ' · ,t004 frn 1916 dom. Camp de Cesar, R oss John & Co.,, 8, r. de la. Ma.rrne. Com toir · Commercial Franco-Egyptien, !!ID 4416. · ' ·. 
Communaute HelMmque, 8, r . Mosquee 1l r Aliou Dardar Conrad (Paull , clt&ncelier du Cononl1\ 
Attarinc, [I]] 2'357. . ComP~ir de Dedou an'ages et de Transit d'Alle1uagne. 
Commnna.uM IsraClite, Gra.nd Rabmna.t, \Yillv R osen1.weig. tram:,it , eto .. 12 •. r . COneeil Sanitairc Maritime et Onannte· 
J , r. N~bi Daniel , l!l!] 326. . Tewiik, !!ill 3806, dom. 5, r . Antomo- naire d '~pte, 1. r . de l'.AncieDJ!O 
Comninaki Fr~res . neg. en po1sson~ fu. des. . . . Bourse. rrfil 345, [[f) B., (vol?' partie 
mes . denrdes doloniales, 45, r. Midan , Comptoir }~st Afr1ca1n (F. I brah1m 1:ew, ofricielle) . . mo 1405 (IE 1510. fick pacha & Co.) , nC,f?e~lSS., Conservatoire Populaire de Mua1que, r. 
Co~1'uinos 
0
(8 .) 1 nt'!g.-commiss., 8 , r . Ge;; Co~ ~i:tF~:~~i'er~ 7~ mercia1 ci 1~- Cesa~. · . d 'at· 
81 pachR. . • P te 4 r Cheri! pacha. (voir p&rtie Consohdated de Londr~ <L•!;.trC,e . h & Compannin cl'Assicurazioni di Milano "ypr . . •11 'i · snra.noes (Branche vi~) , .o:il o~c oru • CM 'f ollic1e e . C t 12 Chen/ pacba, = ""'· 
C (ageuce) ~i/~i ~~~!e di rA~sicurazioni Comptoir G6neral d'Eleo.tricite, in, t~\l•· llll l.592 s, ' r . 
ompogn1a _. ri s· & C a.gents g~- tions ~Jedriques . fourmtures pour .., ec· . . 8 F b 10 r S1&m• e Trasporti, A. E1erl.r0, Cot; lffll 8971 lricit6 18 r. Scsostris, m1J )187, 1Ul Consortium, fl.Von r res, ' . nCraux, 26, r. g 1se P , l!!!j I OGJ ' ' 1,oul. 
!Ell 598. · 
J 
ffiRRARElLE EAU MINlRALE , NITPRELLl = GOUT DtLICIEUX ---: I 
Dissolution Directory listing
Figure A1: Company notic s
Source: Journal des Tribunaux Mixtes d’Égypte No. 416 18/19 Novembre 1925 p.15, No. 647 Mercredi
1/12 Mai 1927 p.33, No. 691 22/23 Août 1927 p.19; the Egytian Directory 1926 p. 451
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